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Abstract 
This edited working paper proposes a new way of appraising the process of European integration, 
taking the notion of Justice as a starting point. With a number of contributions from the leading 
theorists of EU integration as well as younger scholars and practitioners of European law, it adopts a 
multi-faceted approach to what the editors branded as a possible "justice deficit" in Europe, looking at 
procedural as well as substantive elements of justice, also connecting justice with legitimacy, 
democracy, the rule of law, and other key principles of European law. Taking justice seriously is no 
doubt an indispensable element of any mature constitutional system. In starting the debate on justice in 
the EU context and immediately involving a number of leading scholars into the debate, the working 
paper aims at bridging an important gap in our theorising of European integration and law by starting a 
wide exchange on the topic of key importance, which is the essence of Justice, informing the 
integration project in Europe. 
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DEBATING EUROPE’S JUSTICE DEFICIT: THE EU, SWABIAN HOUSEWIVES, RAWLS, AND 
 RYANAIR 
Edited by Gráinne de Búrca, Dimitry Kochenov and Andrew Williams 
Foreword: What is in this paper? 
This paper contains an edited transcript of the proceedings of the Colloquium on ‘Europe’s Justice 
Deficit: Beyond Good Governance?’ convened by Gráinne de Búrca (NYU School of Law), Dimitry 
Kochenov (University of Groningen, Faculty of Law) and Andrew Williams (Warwick Law School) 
on 22–23 September, 2012 at LSE in London. The colloquium has been financed by the Groningen 
Faculty of Law (GSL), Warwick University and NYU School of Law and benefited from the venue 
generously provided by the European Institute of the London School of Economics and Political 
Science. The convenors are grateful to these Schools for support and, in particular, to Aurelia Colombi 
Ciacchi of GSL and Damian Chalmers of LSE, as well as to the various Law Schools, which financed 
the participation of individual speakers in this event. Special thanks are due to Adam McCann, Daniël 
H.K. Overgaauw and Suryapratim Roy, graduate students in Groningen, who transcribed the 
proceedings as well as to Jenny Wilson for administrative support. Suryapratim Roy’s assistance has 
been particularly invaluable in helping to edit this working paper.  
A more conventional outcome of the colloquium will be an edited book entitled Europe’s Justice 
Deficit? to be published by Hart Publishing, Oxford in 2014. 
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Introduction  
The gradual constitutional evolution of the European Union has not been accompanied by the 
articulation or embrace of any substantive ideal of justice going beyond the founders’ intent or the 
economic objectives of the market integration project. This absence compromises the essential 
foundations of the EU legal system since the relationship between law and justice – a crucial question 
within any political system – remains largely unaddressed.  
This working paper documents a colloquium convened by the editors, which united leading scholars 
and young researchers whose work addresses both legal and philosophical aspects of justice in the 
European legal context. The aim of the meeting was to appraise the existence and nature of the deficit 
of justice in Europe, its implications for Europe’s future, and to begin a critical discussion about how 
it might be addressed. There have been too many accounts of the EU as a story of constitutional 
evolution and a system of transnational governance with little or no attention to the implications for 
justice. 
The European Union today has certainly moved beyond the initial emphasis purely on the 
establishment of an internal market, as the growing importance of inter alia EU citizenship and social 
rights suggests. Yet, virtually all the legal doctrines and academic analyses of the EU Treaties and case 
law are premised broadly on the assumption that EU law still largely serves the purpose of perfecting 
what is fundamentally a system of economic integration. The place to be occupied by the underlying 
substantive ideal of justice remains significantly underspecified or even vacant, creating a tension 
between the market-oriented foundation of the Union and the contemporary essence of its 
constitutional system. The relationship of law to justice is a core dimension of constitutional systems 
around the world and the EU should be no different in that respect.  
We hope that a critical exchange of opinions on justice in the Europe which took place at the London 
colloquium will provide valuable accompanying material to the collection of essays on Europe’s 
Justice Deficit?, edited by the convenors and assembling the contributions by the majority of the 
participants of the colloquium, as well as additionally invited scholars, including Alexander Somek 
and Vlad Perju. This working paper, together with the book, aspires to contribute to the creation of a 
fuller picture of the justice deficit in the EU going beyond the given confines of EU law, thus opening 
up an important new avenue of legal research of immediate importance.  
 
The editors 
June 2013 
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First Session: Justification, Proportionality and Irrationality 
Neil Walker: Justice and Justification 
Let me turn the premise of the conference on its head. The premise, or the basic question asked, was 
why so little of the discourse and scholarship on the EU seems interested in justice, but actually I think 
an awful lot of people are interested in justice. In fact, what this conference has shown is that if you 
look carefully, a real momentum is developing around thinking about the EU in terms of justice. Part 
of that is about individual justice or corrective justice. There has always been a discourse in that area, 
a strong one within the EU. Here I see Sionaidh, for example, who has done a lot of work on this over 
the recent years, but many other people have as well. But I think one of the things that has become 
more prominent recently is what I would call collective justice – justice as an attribute or feature of the 
European Union as a whole. What I do in my short paper is, first of all, to try to show the attraction of 
that approach. Why is it that people have become more interested in this? And also to show some of 
the limitations and some of the difficulties associated with that interest. I will say something about the 
first and if I have any time, say something about the second.  
As regards the first, if we look at the history of the legitimation of the EU, it has tended to follow a 
distinction between what I would call derivative theories of legitimacy and other original theories of 
legitimacy. But these original theories of legitimacy have tended to focus upon democracy as opposed 
to other originalist conceptions, and the derivative theories have been delegation-based, have been 
trustee-based, have been efficiency-based etcetera. In my paper I try to explain and try to link the 
move from delegation to original legitimation to a point in the development of the EU as a polity. 
We are increasingly in need of original legitimation, which was not seen as strongly in the past as it is 
today. Originally, we got away with proposing derivative forms of legitimation of the EU. But 
gradually, of course, that has been challenged by a kind of originalist alternative – the idea that the 
EU, because of the range and seriousness of these policy objectives, has to be justified by the same 
fundamental democratic principles as a state. And so what we have in recent years is a kind of standoff 
between these two different types of justification. And justice presents itself to some people as an 
attractive bridging idea between these two different sets of options. What I do in my paper is enter a 
debate initiated by people like Danny Nicol and Jürgen Neyer on the right to justification as one 
particular conception of justice - one of the ways in which one can think about this, and whether or not 
it provides a reasonable or helpful way. And basically, what I am saying is that the justice debate, 
those who are attracted by the idea of justice tend to be those who have some sympathy with the 
originalist argument, but have objections or reservations about the democratic version of the originalist 
argument. The objections to the democratic vision tend to be twofold.  
One is the motivational objection that we find in various of the papers that there is simply not the 
political and cultural conditions of a European demos, and therefore the kind of political energy you 
need for democracy to work at the EU level. There are well-known objections and well-known 
responses to these objections, often developed around the work of Habermas. The second objection 
has to do with the intrinsic appropriateness of a democratic discourse for the EU. There tend to be two 
sorts of challenges here. One is that the EU is simply a different kind of beast, that it remains 
something significantly other than a state in terms of the limitations of its mandate etcetera. The 
second objection has more to do with what we may call the negative sum objection concerning more 
democracy at EU level. Democracy at the EU level does not stand in an infinitely positive relationship 
with democracy at the national level; instead, there is some kind of trade-off, some kind of difficulty 
in maximising both. So, what people who talk about justice and who talk in particular about an 
accumulative order of justice as a right to justification in any and all contexts seem to be doing is 
acknowledging some of the limitations or at least some of the reservations about democracy at the 
European level and asking ‘is there some way in which we can tweak, reconstruct, reconfigure the 
notion of political equality as some kind of right to justification within a community of reciprocity in a 
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way which allows us to legitimate the EU in a manner similar to representative and assembly forms of 
democracy at the national level, but recognizing that these forms of legitimation are not exactly the 
same’? And what I try to do in the paper is to look at this and examine both the positive and the 
negative sides of it. The positive side of it is that it allows for a more variegated conception of what 
we may call accountability in the EU and one which recognizes the fact that the EU is very much a 
multi-institutional beast. We have all sorts of different institutional contexts including the 
Commission, the Council and comitology agencies, all with discrete norms and needs of justification. 
The downside of it is that there is a sense in which the EU as a polity has at least some of the same 
top-down logic as a state. There is still some kind of need and some kind of argument for a steering 
justification for the centre. It is not something which can be disaggregated completely into component 
parts. 
Jürgen Neyer: Who’s Afraid of Justice? 
Much of the debate we have had is tied to the question of “who is afraid of justice”. I owe this title to 
an exchange with Danny Nicol – thanks for that1 – and his critique of my original argument, which is 
hopefully now more clear than it was before. It is an argument about constructing a new European 
narrative and I think that pretty much captures it. The problem from which I start is that I think the EU 
has raised and still raises, democratic expectations which it is incapable of delivering. The most 
important reason why it is not delivering its democratic promises is basically that the EU is 
structurally incapable of delivering – it is structurally incapable of democracy. And I think there are 
three reasons for that. First, the European Union is a compromise between individual and state 
equality. This compromise is for good reasons built into the very structures of the European Union. 
Secondly, the European Union has a constitutionally limited problem solving capacity. Member 
States’ agents have intentionally limited the EU’s problem solving capacity which is, again, not 
according to democratic criteria. And thirdly, the EU must live with a fragmented public sphere which 
will remain with it for the foreseeable future. If all three issues are of a structural character, and if we 
nevertheless aim at justifying the EU, then we are faced with the challenge of finding a convincing 
alternative to supranational democracy. Is there any normatively sound alternative to talking about 
democracy in the European Union? That is how I came down to thinking about justice, and the 
methodology I call normative realism.  
Normative realism is a methodology which flips back from positive analysis to normative reflection. It 
starts with trying to understand the structures of the entity we are talking about – the European Union. 
Then to get us a standard setting procedure to developing a standard which fits this entity. The third 
step reconstructs the European Union in the language of the developed standard and checks whether 
pertinent normative problems can be dealt with meaningfully. The fourth step criticizes the European 
Union in the terms of this analytical language, to see if there is a critical bite in this new language. It 
also formulates institutional reform proposals. Why use the language of justice for establishing such 
an approach to the EU? Justice, as opposed to democracy, is a universal standard. You can apply it 
anywhere – the setting of the nation state, the beginning of an international organization. It is much 
more broadly applicable than the notion of democracy, which is tied to a large number of empirical 
preconditions. The concept of justice that I am working with is a procedural concept. In this I take a 
lot of inspiration from Rainer Forst. The proposed approach defines justice as the outcome of a 
justificatory process, so it is not a substantive notion of justice, but a procedural notion of justice – 
justice as the outcome of a justificatory process. Why is justification most important here? 
Justification is a contestable claim to legitimize the negative effects of our own actions on others. If 
you do something which has an effect, an impact on somebody else, limiting his or her freedom, then 
                                                     
1
 See D. Nicol, ‘Can Justice Dethrone Democracy in the European Union: A reply to Jürgen Neyer’ 50 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 508 (2012); J. Neyer, ‘Who’s Afraid of Justice: A rejoinder to Danny Nicol’ 50 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 523 (2012). 
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you will have to produce good reasons for justifying that. So, what do we do, when we justify? We try 
to legitimize the negative effects of our own actions – or the state tries to legitimize the negative 
effects of law provisions and so forth. Just, then, are those actions that have successfully withstood 
contestation in a consented triadic setting. There must be a third independent party which assesses the 
normative merits of the arguments that have been raised.  
If I bring all this together and approach the European Union, then what do we see if we adopt this 
analytical language? Then we see a European Union which is not a superstate in the making, but is an 
instrument for democratizing democracies by fostering transnational justificatory discourses. 
Democracy cannot be located in only one state – states have external effects. So, there is a 
transnational need for cross-border justification. The European Union does not have a democratic 
deficit; member states have democratic deficits. The EU has a justice deficit; it is an incompletely 
justified structure of justification. A structure of justification which is imperfectly justified itself, so 
there is some good and some bad. And finally, the European Union should not focus on mimicking the 
democratic nation state, but focus on expanding avenues for contestation and establish its legitimacy 
on an idea of a just layer of governance that is a logical and necessary institutional corollary to 
economic and social interdependence in Europe. 
Stavros Tsakyrakis: Disproportionate Individualism  
When we are talking about human rights, many theorists in Europe and elsewhere prefer the term 
‘individual rights’. I consider this terminology unfortunate from the point of human rights theory and 
adjudication. The underlying philosophy of the proportionality test, which has become the 
predominant method for resolution of rights and interests, has as its starting point the individualistic 
idea that everyone has a prima facie right to everything. This method, then, proceeds to achieve the 
optimal realization of his rights and interests by means of a balancing exercise.  
The prima facie right to everything is a sophisticated reformulation of the Hobbesian right to 
everything, even to one another’s body. The prima facie right leaves open the possibility that it may be 
restricted whenever this is necessary for maintaining the social union. We can cast the same idea in 
terms of freedom. Individuals prima facie enjoy total freedom. In a society they are not enjoying total 
freedom, but just the amount that is necessary to secure the mutual enjoyment of the remaining portion 
of their freedom. Very crudely, the above scheme represents the basis for the old liberalistic tradition 
and seeks to maximize freedom. The less freedom we seek, the better off society and individuals are. 
Social value and justice takes the back seat since the front seat is held by individuals and their 
interests. 
I find the re-emergence of individualistic liberalism problematic for both methodological and 
substantive reasons. Individualism is a methodologically flawed abstraction, because there is no such 
thing as the unencumbered self. There never has been, and it is not an appropriate starting point for 
establishing civil society. Aristotle’s assertion that man is a social being and cannot be conceived 
outside society is true. This means that the practice of sharing things with others is prior to the notion 
of individual self-interest. 
Thus, starting from the sociability of human beings, do we sacrifice individuality? We come to an 
attractive notion of individuality if we derive from and relate it to the notion of fair sociability. We 
tend to think that for a society to be just it must provide for social arrangements. A just society 
requires equal respect and concern for each one of its members. Citizens are properly afforded rights 
only so far as the rights fill their status as free and equal participants of a liberal society that they enter 
by birth and exit upon death. This approach does not lose sight of the distinctiveness of every human 
being. On the contrary, it fits well with the idea of persons being moral agents to whom organized 
society owes unconditional respect, but differs from individualistic liberalism since it is the notion of a 
fair society that supports the idea of human worth, of human dignity, of equal concern and respect. We 
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could call such an approach to the formation of individual rights and to the primacy of the social 
‘liberal sociability’.  
The concept of liberal sociability, then, is that individual rights are derived from the conception of a 
fair society rather than a doctrine that gives methodological priority to the individual and his freedom. 
Within liberal sociability, justice and solidarity find their appropriate place. We care for justice and 
solidarity, because we are the sorts of beings that participate in collective endeavours which 
constitutively constrain our liberty, and implicate our interests and the interests of others. By contrast, 
in the individualistic view, justice gets a bad name. Europe has never succumbed to this individualist 
liberalism, but the emergence of this philosophy is dangerous to justice. 
Gareth Davies: Negotiating Justice 
A lot of writing about legitimacy in Europe deals with certain recurrent themes: democracy, 
accountability, identity, and redistribution sometimes, and now justice. I have a quarrel with these. My 
point about it is this: that from the point of view of legitimacy they are means and not ends. The 
problem is primarily a lack of social legitimacy in terms of a lack of acceptance of Europe as 
legitimate justice by the public. It is often assumed that things such as democracy, identity, and so on 
will promote that acceptance and also cause people to make a choice for Europe which would 
transform its legitimacy. And my point here is that there is plenty of research showing that when 
people make choices they do not just do so for functional reasons or identity based reasons, but for 
more subtle reasons which one could describe as emotional, but I rather describe as aesthetic. 
Research on political choice making, economic choice making, all kinds of choice making, including 
memberships of groups, has to do with complex subtle things, things which are as complex as 
humanity is. The reason why it deserves more attention is precisely that the EU is actually deficient in 
its ability to present aesthetic qualities to its people.  
If one looks at national politicians, when they make laws, they do not sell them to the public narrowly 
in terms of their functional outcomes. They sell their decisions as part of a bigger picture, which is – 
when you look at symbolic language, emotional language – they paint a big picture of the world, and 
then make a claim that their law is part of this picture. And that is not just a peripheral populist 
phenomenon. It is part of what people want from governments, law and politicians. It is part of the 
expressive function of law that it gives people a picture of themselves, is responsive and makes them 
feel bonded with law, because it expresses images and values and aesthetics to which they relate. 
Precisely what the EU cannot do is this: this aspect of the law is constitutionally prohibited. I think the 
real legitimacy problem with the EU is its attributed powers. The doctrine of attributed powers 
condemns the EU to present its actions in terms of narrow functions, and also to present them in a 
language of inevitability – that is why lawyers like Europe so much. Not in terms of political choices – 
you know they are there – but in terms of narrowing it to ‘this must be done to achieve this concrete 
goal’. In peripheral language, the language of bigger symbolism has no place. Whenever one uses the 
language of larger symbolism, they are vulnerable to two criticisms. When European politicians or 
European representatives speak in terms of grand vision or aesthetic vision one common criticism is: 
this is mere empty words, hot air, this person does not realize that Europe cannot do this. The other 
criticism is: this is wrongful, this person is trying to stretch Europe beyond what it is, is trying to claim 
Europe has powers to do things it should not. Both criticisms are legally correct, but what it means is 
that Europe is denied the language that it needs to make contact with the population and to create the 
bond that gives rise to social acceptance. And all the technocratic legitimacy adjustments, procedures 
and even identity, do not really address this.  
This does not have to be a huge problem. If Europe is a small technocratic operation, fine, let it be 
that. The problem that has arisen is that Europe has grown so much – it is hard to see it now as a mere 
delegate of Member States. It has become an umbrella for the more responsive and expressive 
Member States, which constrains the Member States by its laws, of course in a fiscal compact, but 
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even before that as much in economic law. So you see this translated to national politics whereby 
politicians are increasingly using the language of narrow functional inevitability, and squeezing out 
the language of bigger vision. We must do this if we must achieve this concrete goal. Other rhetoric, 
other images, other languages are illegitimate, if not actually prohibited. And what this means is that 
Europe cannot be responsive and expressive; it takes away the capacity of Member States to be 
responsive and expressive, and ultimately denies Europeans expressive responsive government.  
The question is: what happens next? What I realize is you cannot have expert government and 
responsive government at the same time. You have to make a choice. Expert government is one and 
responsive government another. And that creates a structural tension. Structural tensions can be 
creative and useful. The history of negative integration is the interaction between them. The question 
is whether this one is stable and constructive, or is it not, and actually I think it is increasingly 
unstable, although responsiveness has been on the back-foot for a long period. The technocratic 
approach, or the expert approach is something that is subject to an internal and external attack. 
External (such as the financial crisis and the lack of respect for experts) but also internal (there is, 
rather, reflexive modernity, postmodernism, a general lack of faith in expert rule which is reflected in 
things like behavioural economics and increasing acceptance amongst the kind of experts who run 
Europe of the limitations of their own expertise). So I think we may be entering a phase of the collapse 
of expertise and the resurgence of responsiveness, and the open question is – does that come by a 
stronger containment of Europe and more responsive resurgence at national level, like more national 
freedom from EU law, or does that come by making Europe a more normal political responsive 
organization, with more political integration and broader powers? I am open on that. I just think that 
from the legitimacy and justice point of view, there is a need to bring back responsive expressive 
government on at least some level. 
Discussion Following the First Session 
 
- Joanne Scott to Jürgen Neyer: What kind of effects do you mean (when you say: “We try to 
legitimize the negative effects of our own actions – or the state tries to legitimize the negative 
effects of law provisions and so forth”)? 
- Jiří Přibáň: It is interesting to see that at a justice colloquium we immediately started to talk about 
legitimacy. Can only a legitimate EU be a just EU? 
- Michael Wilkinson to Jürgen Neyer: What model of democracy do you apply to assert that it does 
not exist?  
- Jan Komárek to Jürgen Neyer: Why do we not define democracy in terms of political equality?  
- Jürgen Neyer: (1) My argument starts with the assertion that the normatively highest value is 
freedom. Democracy is a mechanism in which a reasonable amount of freedom can be facilitated. 
That is where the phenomenon of external effects becomes relevant. (2) Does ought imply can? 
Philosophically it is not possible, but politically it is, at least seen from the approach of normative 
realism. (3) My argument has been developed for the time being as long as the EU does not 
change its structure fundamentally; it concerns a certain empirical condition. (4) The EU is set up 
intentionally not to maximize political equality for individuals. Justice is the value, and democracy 
might be a proper instrument to facilitate justice. This is the case within the nation state, but not 
necessarily on the supranational level. 
- Neil Walker: (1) Legitimacy as a moral concept can be seen as a shadow concept of justice, often 
with little added value. Social legitimacy is more interesting. The right to justification does not 
reduce legitimacy to acceptability, but it is one important dimension. (2) The idea of political 
equality is that it corrects for inequalities or asymmetries of people or peoples in the political 
system.  
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- Agustín J. Menéndez: May I say that there are two premises which the presentation takes for 
granted, but which in my mind should be far from being taken for granted? Firstly, can we really 
argue that the equality of Member States, on which the Union was premised, and which informed 
the peculiar (and in some senses incomplete) institutional structure and decision-making process 
of the Union, is still there? A fiscal union such as the one that is emerging is one which is 
premised on some states being more equal than others. Reversed qualified majority, generalised by 
the Fiscal Compact, makes surplus states structurally more equal than deficit states. Secondly, 
proportionality is a structural principle which helps us think about problems, but does not solve 
them for us. To render proportionality an operative principle, it is necessary to fill it with both data 
and to take specific decisions. Can we really say that the way in which the European Court of 
Justice operates within the principle makes the decisions of the ECJ justified? Should we not 
actually check case by case first? After which, it would be possible to determine if there is a 
similarity (or not) between the decisions of the ECJ and national constitutional courts. 
- Oliver Gerstenberg: (1) Why give up on the standard of democratic legitimacy? There appears to 
be a strong relation between the EU and democratic legitimacy. (2) We must be careful to 
distinguish between justice and political legitimacy: of the two, legitimacy is the weaker—less 
demanding—notion. People who sharply, pervasively, and often reasonably disagree about socio-
economic justice may still be able to share a framework of political legitimacy within which 
substance may be settled. Hence I believe the turn from legitimacy to justice in some of our 
discussions is misguided: it ignores hard facts of reasonable interpretive and ideological pluralism 
which drive the distinction in the first place and which are characterstic of contemporary Europe. 
- Andrew Williams: A provocative question: do we actually need democracy, for certain forms of 
justice? For example, is democracy necessary for redistribution? 
- Oliver Gerstenberg: Are we then all apostates from democracy now? 
- Justine Lacroix to Stavros Tsakyrakis: (1) I would say that the concept of individualism includes 
autonomy and implies social justice, so why the diabolization of individualistic liberalism? (2) 
What do you mean when everyone has a right to everything? 
- Gareth Davies: Do we need democracy? Yes, but it is a question of degree. An important question 
is who decides whether the EU is good: ‘us’, the experts, or ‘them’, the people? 
- Stavros Tsakyrakis: (1) Everyone has their own distinctiveness and autonomy, and I accept the 
notion of individuality, but it is not the starting point. It rather derives from a notion of fair 
sociability. For example the notion of a fair family union requires the recognition of distinct 
individuals that compose it. (2) I am not inventing this kind of individualistic liberalism, it exists, 
and poses a challenge especially in this time of crisis because it implies that either sociability is of 
a secondary importance or structures it in terms of an individual’s mere utility. 
- Neil Walker: (1)We have already failed when we say that a different vocabulary of political 
morality should be used for the states and the EU. (2) The relationship between democracy and 
justice may not always be direct; think about expert committees etc. (3) The relationship between 
political equality and democracy is that they are an expression of a similar belief, and the 
difference is a matter of abstraction. 
- Mattias Kumm: Since there is disagreement about many policy issues, the vocabulary has shifted 
to ‘justice’ instead. However, now there is disagreement about justice, and the vocabulary shifts to 
‘legitimacy’. The next step will be that there will be disagreement about legitimacy, and the 
vocabulary will shift to ‘legality’. But because lawyers also agree, we now hope for a final arbiter. 
The different vocabularies we have are deeply connected, however. 
- Oliver Gerstenberg: I think legitimacy—and legitimation-worthiness—is where the spade turns. 
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Second Session: Multi-Layered Law, Legitimacy and the Markets 
Floris de Witte: Integrating National and Transnational Justice Claims 
I think that, at the highest level of abstraction, justice has to be about allowing people to live good 
lives. Everyone will have a different idea of what the good life is. Even in this room, probably, even 
though we have largely similar interests or life styles, everyone will have a rather different definition 
of what the good life is. So, in order to transform this idea of the good life into anything of actual 
justice, we need a system that allows us to articulate our individual views of the good life, and a 
system that mediates between that and a collective compromise, one solution ‘this is what we think 
what the good life is’. That system of course is a political system. By political system, I do not really 
mean a system revolving every four years, but a thicker conception of politics, which contains civic 
spaces and public spheres, which really allows people to actually articulate their conception of the 
good life, as an individual and as a part of a community. This thick notion of political systems, of 
course, also has a very convenient function that ties people together in a communal destiny which 
stimulates the redistribution of resources within a community and thereby allows for the 
institutionalisation of the moral links that citizens have with their fellow citizens in the same 
community. Some people think it is based on a sort of ethno-historical account of nature and language 
which is intrinsically national. I think it is more probably tied to this democratic space in which 
people’s destinies are tied together, which allows them to see each other’s needs and desires, and 
offers them an instrument to alleviate such needs or foster desires.  
Now, if that is what justice is, then the EU clearly lacks most of these preconditions, and the 
democratic space that can mediate between different views of ‘the good’ and thereby legitimise the 
outcome. This is essentially a contractarian theory of justice, which I think is in very general terms 
accepted everywhere. From that perspective, the EU cannot contribute to justice. I think if we go back 
a little bit, and think of justice as allowing people to live good lives, then we can see how we could 
actually contribute to making sure that the externalities of contractarianism are limited. There are two 
main ways in which I think the EU can do so. The most important one is that even though 
contractarianism allows everyone to freely decide what a ‘good life’ means to them, the political 
system necessarily only allows only one outcome – one outcome is the collective outcome. For four 
years (or however long the electoral cycle is, there is one outcome even though we have five to ten 
million different views on what is ‘just’. So, what the European Union does – and especially free 
movement law – is that it allow citizens to find out where the good life lies in twenty-six other 
constellations. So you are no longer tied to the outcome of one polity – the outcome in your nation 
state. You can simply move to other ones. I am Belgian, for example, and I live in London; for some 
reason either personal or professional, for me the good life at the moment is in London. If the most 
important aspect in my life is nice weather or good night life or to be with certain persons in a certain 
country, then I can – in theory - move. The EU allows me to pursue my good life beyond just voting. 
In that way, the European Union allows us to go beyond the limits of contractarian justice. The second 
way, which is more familiar to EU lawyers, is non-discrimination. Not only can I move between 
different Member States, but I am not excluded. I am excluded from political participation, I cannot 
voice what I think is the good life in the UK for example, but I am entitled to the outcomes of that 
political process. So I as a foreigner can also access those public goods. In these two ways EU law can 
be seen as actually contributing to justice beyond the capabilities and institutions of the nation state. 
So, to put it very bluntly, the nation state is very good at generating, at allowing people to live, to 
articulate what they want in constructing a communal vision of the good life, especially in terms of 
limited resources – health care, education and whatever you want. EU law mitigates exclusionary 
effects of that contractarian view by allowing you to move beyond the one normative outcome, and it 
entitles the migrant to access redistributive resources in the host Member State.  
Now I will very quickly sum up. This is a nice conception, of course, but the problem is that there is a 
strong tension here, because we redistribute resources within Member States, which is justified by 
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reference to a general sort of reciprocity and diffuse solidarity that does not necessarily extend to 
‘outsiders’. So, ‘we are all tied together’ also means that we all get to put something in and get 
something out. If you allow people to move beyond different Member States this idea of reciprocity is 
slightly skewed. To use a very blunt example: if the unemployed Greeks or Italians fly to Sweden but 
with Ryan Air and they are allowed to say ‘hi, I am a European citizen, unemployment benefit, 
please’; the problem is that the Swedish electorate might say a few years down the line ‘actually we do 
not see that they deserve this’, while the non-discrimination obligations under EU law make the only 
possible policy adaptation the decrease or even abolition of unemployment benefit. Such a move may 
hurt migrant EU citizens, but will primarily hurt unemployed Swedish citizens. The problem here is 
that the European conception of justice of free movement and access to redistributed resources of the 
country is parasitic on the actual existence of solidarity within the nation state. So, what I think we 
should be thinking about in terms of how the European Union contributes to justice, is how to 
overcome this conundrum. I work on this in view of transnational solidarity, trying to find out which 
commitments of solidarity and reciprocity are implicit in the process of European integration, which 
are either market commitments or commitments based on Union citizenship, or commitments toward 
the aspiration mobility of people, and try to tie this together to reciprocal obligations of solidarity. 
Michael Wilkinson: One Market, Many Peoples 
I approach the issue of social justice in what, for lack of better terminology, I call a ‘political 
functional way’ – where social justice is viewed as a struggle for equality in all spheres – economic, 
social, political. To the extent that social justice is achieved it will be by social movements, popular 
pressure, democratic methods, above all politically, not through a theory of justice, or through notions 
of justification. And it might be worth pointing out that since Rawls wrote a Theory of Justice,
2
 levels 
of inequality in the US have increased and reached levels actually quite unprecedented since the 
1920s.  
From a political functional perspective you get a quite straightforward picture of the problem of 
achieving social justice, what I call a ‘moving picture’ of the dynamic of the struggle for social justice. 
It is captured neatly in Wolfgang Streeck’s recent work on political economy on the antagonism 
between capitalism and democracy.
3
 This is interesting in itself, because it challenges the traditional 
liberal assumption of an affinity between capitalism and democracy. It is interesting in its own right, 
reflecting a deep tension that suggests democratic politics is subject both to the pressures of the 
financial markets, and to the demands of the people. Now, it is not only disillusioned ex-Marxists who 
express this view of the antagonism between democracy and capitalism. I quote Jürgen Habermas: ‘In 
the modern era the market and politics have had to be repeatedly balanced off against each other in 
order to preserve the network of the relations of solidarity among members of the political community. 
There always remains a tension between capitalism and democracy, because the market and politics 
rest on conflicting principles.’4  
Now, I don’t want to go into what these principles specifically are, it suffices to say it is in itself an 
entire research project looking at the conflict between competition and cooperation between the 
common good (solidarity) and individualism. Rather than pursue that conceptual dilemma what I 
would like to do is query, if you like, what are the implications for European integration of this 
‘dynamic equilibrium’. According to Wolfgang Streeck, we see this dynamic played out in the 
European Union at what he calls “breathtaking speed”, pointing out the logic of the market’s demand 
of removal of elected politicians: look at the recent case of Italy. I say demand, but there is no direct 
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cause and effect between the market and what happens in politics – because in politics we deal with 
contingency and human choice. I will come back to that; we should consider the competing logics of 
capitalism and democracy, not necessarily in terms of necessity, which would be the way historical 
materialism approaches it, but simply as a pressure toward certain forms of institutional change. Now, 
the upshot in the EU seems to be the result rather of having one market – as I call it – and many 
peoples. It is rather problematic, because this sort of asymmetry is making it too difficult for political 
channels to correct the market imbalances, the inequalities that the market produces. Political channels 
are weak – there are few channels for correcting or civilizing the market in the EU. There may also be 
sociological constraints – in other words the lack of solidarity – and of course that is a huge question 
now when you are looking at what is going on in Greece and Germany and elsewhere. It seems to me 
that a more compelling point rather than simply look at it in terms of dividing Europe into various 
demoi on national lines is, to consider that transnational solidarity might exist, in particular along class 
lines. And this is a point that Streeck is elaborating. Now it does seem to me that the ‘no demos’ thesis 
is always a vicious circle, however it is understood. It is always a vicious circle. If we look at the 
origin of the ‘no demos’ thesis – the German court in its Maastricht decision quotes Herman Heller in 
support of the proposition.
5
 Now, Herman Heller’s thesis was about socioeconomic equality: Heller 
thought that democracy without some level of socioeconomic equality would inevitably lead to 
authoritarianism. My sense is that this historically confirms that there is a strong interrelationship 
between justice and democracy, and we ignore this relationship at our peril.  
Nevertheless, the asymmetry remains, the strong asymmetry in Europe between – to put it crudely – 
one market and many peoples, although I would say that I want a question mark added. There is this 
real asymmetry, which seems to lead to a proper impasse. In other words, there is a lack of channels, 
political channels for redressing the imbalance between capitalism and democracy. I will finish with 
one final claim which is how we can emerge from this impasse. It seems to me unlikely so long as the 
tension between capitalism and democracy is a tension between incommensurables. In other words, 
there is a tendency to view capitalism and markets as part of the natural world, as an evolutionary 
social force which we can do nothing about, and we cannot in Jürgen Neyer’s terms. But I think that is 
the wrong way of looking at it, because if we consider that the market is a product of political choices 
then its results can also be reversed. That is why I end by quoting Joseph Weiler’s early work where 
he specifically and emotively claimed that the choice for a market Europe was a political choice, and 
not the result of pure natural forces.
6
 
Oliver Gerstenberg: The Question of Standards for the EU: “Legitimacy” or “Substantive Justice?” 
The Question of Standards Posed. 
The controversy about Europe’s “democratic deficit” has continued unabated.7 But is now a semantic 
shift (or even “paradigm-shift”) from “democratic deficit” to “justice deficit” advisable? Should we 
replace the focus on democratic legitimacy with a (search for a) more comprehensive—EU-wide—
“substantive ideal of justice” (as the organizers of this conference wonder and may even be 
intimating)?  
Are we then all apostates from democracy now? In what follows, my answer to these questions will be 
“no.” Writing or reading a “substantive ideal of justice” into law will of course give rise to 
interminable familiar debates about what lawyers call justiciability—the specter of (European) judges 
usurping domestic democratic prerogatives of “the people themselves.” At a deeper level, if the 
substantive ideal of justice is meant to express a collectively shared European aspiration, in an 
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ideologically deeply divided EU, it appears there just is no overlapping consensus on a substantive 
ideal—a European “social model,” as it’s sometimes called—forthcoming. 
Rather than embarking on a futile—possibly even defeatist—search for a substantive umbrella-ideal of 
justice, Europeans should instead focus on establishing an EU-wide framework of political legitimacy 
which enables European discourse and within which ongoing debate about conceptions of 
socioeconomic justice and mutual learning from diverse experience is, and continues to remain, 
possible. Call this the deliberative turn. But to the extent that we also insist that the terms of that 
procedural framework must be themselves open to continued self-revision and recursive, the 
deliberative turn is already a democratic experimentalist one. 
The institutional thrust of the democratic experimentalist model is this: the suggestion to weaken the 
culturally deeply entrenched attachment, in Europe, to a judicial-supremacist mode of judicial review 
and instead to allow judges to enforce avowedly open-textured, fundamental public commitments in 
ways that invite rather than exclude continuing demotic and social determination by stakeholders of 
what these commitments can and should come to mean in practice. Instead of trying to master and 
contain diversity, we should aim at producing it and embrace diversity as a resource of mutual 
learning from best practice and of ongoing benchmarking and of democracy. 
Justice versus Legitimacy  
So we must be careful to distinguish between justice and political legitimacy. Of the two, legitimacy is 
the weaker—less demanding—notion. Legitimacy provides an answer to the problem of political 
justification: of how the coercive imposition of the power of the state can be justified even to 
reasonable dissenters who disagree with its exercise. A legitimate regime is one whose requirements 
the citizens generally have reason to comply with because they are its requirements. Individuals with 
persistently differing (but often reasonable) understandings of justice and fairness may nonetheless 
still agree on a background institutional framework of political legitimacy, to be used in deciding how 
disagreements over substance (that is to say socioeconomic justice) are to be dealt with. If individuals 
can agree to this framework-procedure (“legitimacy standard”), then they would have in some relevant 
sense agreed to the laws which the procedure produces, and hence laws will be, pro tanto, justified.
8
 
But what are the requirements of political legitimacy? A debate today rages between constitutional 
liberals and advanced democrats, who among themselves disagree over the depth and reach of 
reasonable interpretive disagreement and the resulting implications for strong-form / weak-form 
practices of constitutional adjudication and judicial versus parliamentary supremacy. Is common 
ground possible? 
Rawlsian constitutional liberals—who are comfortable with judicial review—rely on an expectation 
of wide agreement within constitutional-democratic societies over when there has been a violation of 
the “central ranges” of the basic negative liberties, including those of free trade, but exclude 
socioeconomic rights (guarantees of fair equality of opportunity) from the range of justiciable 
constitutional essentials, out of a concern with justiciability. By contrast, advanced or deep democrats 
are committed to the realization of just such rights, but convinced that courts will not give them a fair 
shake and therefore opposed to the judicialisation of rights. In particular, (say) Waldronian strong 
democrats / democratic positivists insist that reasonable interpretive disagreement spreads so wide and 
cuts so deep—even into the core of civil and political rights—that any form of rights-based judicial 
review will inevitably debase the respect for the dignitarian-liberal individual super- or master-right to 
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an equal voice in deciding reasonably contestable questions of liberal constitutional interpretation in 
the domestic political forum of majoritarian politics. Whereas the former see the EU as epitomizing 
“the sovereignty of law” (F. Jacobs), the latter accordingly view the EU along more republican-
intergovernmentalist lines as a demoi-cracy and reject strong-form judicial review. 
Yet both these positions face costs. On the liberal-constitutionalist side, legitimacy beats back justice 
but the omission of socioeconomic rights from the constitutional essentials may have the effect of 
undermining the political legitimation-worthiness of a constitutional regime itself. But the strong 
democrats’ rejection of judicial review, too, turns out to have hidden costs. Strong democrats insist, as 
they must, that the parliamentary side of the country’s political life and practice must be in “good 
working order” (Waldron) in order to warrant inclusion into politics of an adequate respect for the 
liberal idea of rights. But the satisfaction of this assumption or prediction is itself likely to be ever and 
always subject to persistent reasonable disagrement: for example, “discrete and insular minorities” 
with no prospect of ever winning in politics may just disagree. And so is the question of whether the 
strong assumption / prediction of a self-governing demos—even if conceived along non-exclusionary 
lines—will ever be satisfied in a politically divided polity: EU law increases burdens of justification 
for the demoi vis-à-vis citizens for their various policies and may force them to reconsider their legal 
and political choices in the light of EU-wide understandings of principle in ways they would not have 
done if left to their own devices. 
In contrast with both liberal-constitutionalist and republican-democratic-positivist traditions, the key 
to the democratic experimentalist approach is the claim that liberal legitimacy-by-constitution is 
procedurally sustainable without placement in any institutional site of a final authority to decide 
compliance. The grip of the stranglehold of the dichotomy of judicial supremacy versus legislative 
supremacy breaks. According to the no-final-decider thesis, courts act as non-dictatorial contributors 
to the cogency and credibility of a process of loosely institutionalised deliberative-democratic debate 
over the implementation of a non-formally realizable principle of fair equality of opportunity over 
time.  
Does the EU compromise democracy? 
Underlying the search for a substantive ideal of justice is a widespread and fundamental but also 
familiar worry about the viability and survival of the national welfare state in the EU. Two mutually 
adverse standard views can be contrasted. 
Neo-liberals will triumphantly answer “yes, and it’s a good thing, too.” The ordoliberal school of 
thought embraced “Europe” on the grounds of a belief in rather a neat division of labour: it would 
become the task of the new European economic law to implement and protect a system of open 
markets and undistorted competition at the supranational level beyond the state, while Member States 
were to retain those legislative powers in the domain of the social that proved compatible with open 
markets. The Contracting States should not allow the political to contaminate the economic. Hayek, 
for example, famously imagined a “new form of international government under which certain strictly 
defined powers are transferred to an international authority, while in all other respects the individual 
countries remain responsible for their internal affairs” (1944: 239), the role of which was to preserve 
“international order or lasting peace” (226) in the absence of “any common ideals of distribute justice” 
(228). 
But in stark contrast to economic constitutionalism, the very different tradition of—political—
liberalism rejected the idea of a self-sustaining “economic law.” “Libertarianism,” Rawls strikingly 
remarked, “lacks the concept of procedural background justice.”9 As Thomas Nagel explains,  
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“[t]he moral key to Rawls’ more expansive position [as compared to economic liberalism] is in the 
idea that, because of the essential role of the state, the law, and the conventions of property in making 
possible the extraordinary productivity and accumulations of a modern economy, we bear collective 
responsibility for the general shape of what results from the sum of individual choices within that 
framework.”10 
Social democrats argue that the moment of “collective responsibility” cannot be attained at the EU 
level and that collective responsibility at the national level is undermined as EU-integration deepens. 
As a result, collective fate-control by the democratically self-governing citizens themselves dissipates. 
The argument begins with the familiar fact that the political project of European integration was to be 
realized by an economic program effectuated through and by the rule of law. The pronounced 
emphasis on “integration through law” had, of course, to do with political stagnation at various 
historical stages of the integration project and could be understood as an audacious but also a 
prudentially wise choice, insofar as transnational legality helped, as Weiler pointed out, prevent free 
riding and provided stability and continuity to any acquis even in periods of political instability and 
wavering commitment.
11
 And yet, according to an influential analysis,
12
 the reliance on law also—by 
way of an unintended consequence—fatefully led, according to that view, to a double constitutional 
asymmetry or bias overall: first, on the substantive level, a bias in favor of economic constitutionalism 
at the transnational level to the detriment of social-political constitutionalism domestically—
concerned with socially “embedded capitalism” (Ruggie) and with the externalities of free markets on 
non-market domains of life—the colonialization of the lifeworld. Second, and institutionally, an 
asymmetry between law and politics; a bias in favor of an unencumbered “supranational” judicial 
politics to the detriment of democratic law and politics “at home”—an undesirable assignment to 
European courts of morally decisive authority in questions concerning society as a whole, which those 
courts are ill-equipped to address.  
Democratic experimentalism to the rescue 
According to the democratic experimentalist model of judicial review, courts act in the first instance as 
instigators and non-dictatorial overseers of engagement among stakeholders (broadly defined, and 
public and private, with no hierarchy), in an ongoing process of interpretive clarification of 
constitutional meaning—a process of subsequent discursive benchmarking. The court serves as arbiter 
but without having the final word: judicial intervention is continuum-izing rather than based on a 
dichotomic contrast between strong-form and weak-form review.
13
 
At a more practical level, and as a matter of assessing the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, I argue 
that there is only scant, or at least inconclusive, evidence for the (Scharpfian) asymmetry-claim. No 
doubt, we all have our bêtes noirs among the case law.
14
 I believe that a more nuanced account than 
the ones offered by some of the critics of this jurisprudence can be given: indeed, the Court has played 
a benign role by both strengthening and transforming the rule of law
15
 on countless occasions and is on 
record for making explicit fundamental legal principles often in surprisingly innovative and 
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unprecedented ways where development was blocked or arrested at the level of national law and 
politics.  
Coda: democratic experimentalism a conception of justice nonetheless? 
So experimentalism rejects the search for a comprehensive “substantive ideal of justice” (which the 
organizers may have had in mind) as misguided. But is perhaps democratic experimentalism itself a 
“substantive ideal of justice?” In one sense, the answer is “possibly yes:” democratic experimentalism 
assumes a world of pervasive uncertainty and vulnerability, with no final decider nor Archimedian 
point—be it a sense of ourselves as rational agents or part of a demos, a set of stable legal 
prescriptions known in advance, of judicial or legislative-majoritarian supremacist claims to finality 
without fallibilism. The sense of uncertainty, about ourselves, and of heightened mutual vulnerabilty 
that comes with it, we rationally hope, sustains our motives to collaborate, to embrace diversity, and to 
learn from the other and the hitherto excluded and despised as we go along as problem-solvers. The 
penalty for abandoning this hope may be loss of self- and fate-control. In this sense, democratic 
experimentalism is not merely an institutional theory—an annex to substance always revealed and 
elaborated elsewhere—but, as Michel Foucault in his 1994 lecture on Kant’s “Was ist Aufklärung” 
once suggested, an “ontologie de nous-mêmes.” 
Damian Chalmers: Kinship, Markets, and Justice in Europe 
One of my brief arguments is that EU law pursues some styles of justice that are very effective, others 
are structurally incapable of pursuing, and these different styles of justice are very pervasive. This 
goes in my view to how you look at the authority of EU law. To start my argument I draw on Neil’s 
discussion and the last session on the relation between democracy and justice.  
My understanding of democracy’s foundation is that it is a community of free and equals. These 
elements of ‘equals’ always implies some relationship between justice and democracy. But that 
remains more indirect; I want to say that my understanding of freedom is something we all do alone or 
in common with other people. Justice on the other hand – this is what is interesting about it – is 
something we have in relation to other people. So it is not just interesting in some notion of justice 
deficit, but in having a political community. How we stand in relation to others within or beyond our 
relations. Now, what I am going to argue is that whatever the modality – distributive or substantive – 
and whatever the justice, there are three styles of justice as I understand in literature. This is what I 
will come back to. (i) There is justice as equality of outcomes, which you see in the work of people 
such as Cohen and Philips
16
 (ii) you then have justice as a threshold concept, this is what you see in 
the work of Rawls, that is given and basic needs or human capabilities, (iii) Thirdly, there is justice as 
a psychoanalytic condition. This is the work of people like Saperstein
17
 and others. You look at the 
relationship of the ‘I’ and the ‘we’, and the politics of recognition. 
I will argue that when you think about these things rather in the abstract you have to look at the 
concept of political communities. You have to look at two things. One is the thing that Rawls is most 
critical of, the underlying conditions that give rise to these relationships in relation to each other, and 
the other is the antagonistic claim – which has not been talked about, but is actually almost the 
counterpart of course – is that the conditions of injustice give rise to the political. And when I say we 
think about these two things – the underlying conditions and this antagonism – in the modern state as I 
understand there are two types of relationships. First, the relationship between people as people – we 
understand each other in opposition and in interaction with each other as human beings. And then he 
draws the other one, where we interact with each other in relation with what we do, in relation with 
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particular common activities. Now, what I find when I look at the EU is that you do not find much. All 
you have is the tension between state and government that does not exist in the EU. It is a purpose-
built organization to set up, to realize certain tasks – it can do these tasks better than any other 
organisation. It might be something beyond that, but we never find an example where the individual 
just exists in some wonderful state qua individuals. It is always for the realization of certain tasks, 
typically those set out in articles 2 and 3 of the TFEU. And this poses a particular challenge for justice 
as a traditional relationship we find in the status quo – that does not exist. To me this means that 
certainly for the EU it is very difficult to realize certain types of justice. Traditionally, justice is based 
on equality of resources or needs, based on the idea of individuals see each other qua individuals, not 
what they contribute to the realization of particular services – health care, social systems and so on. 
Maybe problematically around the idea of kinship, but actually recreate it at the European level is 
equally problematic – it is not clear to me why we should be giving health care to, say, our fellow 
French, not Bangladeshis. What the EU does quite well in my view is – while it cannot do equality of 
resources, it struggles to a certain extent is the idea of justice around minimum needs, the threshold 
concepts – however, it does have focus on common activities or mutual dependence – the idea that 
Durkheim had – mutual dependency on each other in labour rights, ecological rights, which generates 
mutual justice claims. This is actually quite strong in the EU. The EU typically does it better than 
Member States. The other thing it does very well is to problematize the idea of community, the 
psychoanalytic notion of justice, by problematizing the pathologies of the nation state which is written 
on ad nausea. This touches a little bit on what Floris said in his presentation. What you find is the EU 
is very good articulating these two forms of justice claims: dependence and the problematization of the 
‘we’. Other forms of justice it just cannot do, even though it tramples upon them again and again and 
again. It cannot avoid touching on them. So, what I argue is – what I said at the beginning – the 
conditions of the political structure of the EU and the injustice, this requires a rethinking of EU law. I 
think it should have authority – it can put us in relation to each other in a way better than other forms 
of political organization: mutual dependence and problematization of relationships very well. But 
where it touches upon other ideas, such as equality of outcomes, basic threshold concepts, I can’t see 
the reasons for its authority if you believe in justice. 
Discussion Following the Second Session 
 
- András Sajó: (1) Is solidarity about justice? More specifically, is solidarity justice, or is it a 
corrective of justice? (2) Are constitutions based not only on procedural justice, but on substantive 
as well? 
- Sionaidh Douglas-Scott: There is something about the nature of the EU which produces a 
particular injustice, mainly that it is parasitic on national solidarity and is unable to produce a 
solidarity of its own. How do we deal with this governance issue? And what is the specific role of 
EU law to this question of justice? 
- Floris de Witte: (1) To me solidarity is a very context-specific expression of justice. Solidarity 
allows for the resources to let justice actually take place. (2) A constitution can also be an 
expression on how we live the good life. 
- Michael Wilkinson: The role of law cuts both ways, both to capitalism and democracy. 
- Oliver Gerstenberg: On the one hand, I am fascinated by these mechanisms, but on the other hand 
I am sceptical about lawyers and their often self-serving legal ideologies (Max Weber’s 
“Standesideologien”). 
- Damian Chalmers: (1) In my view, what is attractive to the EU is that it does not have the 
pretensions of a state. (2) What is interesting about justice is that it concerns how we stand in 
relation to each other. 
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- Daniel Augenstein: The EU might be a purposive organization, but the same can be said about 
nation states. What makes an inquiry into the EU’s justice deficit distinctive is not that it is a 
purposive organization, but that its main purpose is a common market. 
- Joanne Scott: What about the good life and ecological and other constraints? In other words, to 
what degree is the good life actually a choice? 
- Jürgen Neyer: How do we assess the strength of normative argument in a methodologically sound 
way? 
- Neil Walker: Can a notion of justice as rationality, which interrogates existing solidarities, itself 
provide a form of solidarity within the EU without an additional expressive dimension? 
- Jiří Přibáň: We are conflating two different types of solidarity: a value-oriented one and a 
descriptive ‘Durkheimian’ one. Is solidarity a relational concept or a procedural concept, which 
you can turn into formal justice instead of social justice? 
- Justine Lacroix: Does your idea of transnational solidarity also imply fiscal harmonisation or 
fiscal distribution, and in what sense is it then still transnational? 
- Damian Chalmers in response to Neil Walker: When I look at EU law in micropractice, it works 
actually quite well – but the question is one I want to think about.  
- Floris de Witte: (1) The good life also concerns ecological issues that may be articulated on 
European level rather than national level. (2) In my paper I reconceptualise the idea of non-
discrimination on basis of solidarity, but there should not be an abuse of rights, which undermines 
trans-national solidarity. 
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Third Session: Euro-Crisis, Solidarity and Private Autonomy 
Danny Nicol: The Contestability of Justice as Exemplified by the Eurozone Crisis 
I believe that discussing justice in the EU we are just milling around in the dark, unless and until, we 
accept the content of justice is preeminently contestable. There are multiple conflicting conceptions of 
justice. Or as Jeremy Waldron puts it ‘there are many of us who disagree about justice, we need 
democracy, so choices over what is justice and unjust can be made and remade.’ The quest for justice 
cannot be severed from the pursuit of democracy. Recent developments have mightily reinforced this 
argument, self-evidently the Eurozone catastrophe has plunged the EU into a period of unparalleled 
crisis, in which competing justice arguments have clashed. Yet in fact the history of the EU is littered 
with examples of the contestability of justice long before the disaster with the Euro. There is the 
example of the Viking and Laval case law.
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 Some argue that it is just because the Court was enforcing 
the four freedoms, which have been a prized part of the EU political package since the very beginning, 
which is based on equality between the States. Others argue that it is unjust because brutal capitalism 
will undermine the welfarism of the older Member States and thereby scupper the chances of the 
newer Member States for similar development. And then again, there is the example of the EU’s 
policy of compelling privatization, through judicial interpretation of Article 106 TFEU, coupled with 
the liberalization directive. Some say the policy is just because it prevents Member States from 
selfishly evading the demands of the single market and improves efficiency. Others say it is unjust 
since it shifts wealth from the poor to the rich. Thus even without the Euro, the very framework of the 
common market was highly contestable in justice terms. On the one hand, we have the justice 
argument advanced by some in Germany that the poorer Member States lied about their economic 
circumstances before joining the Euro, and afterwards embarked on an irresponsible spending spree 
since the Euro meant cheap money. It would be unjust to inflict on German citizens to have to pay for 
a vacation from reality on the part of these states. Chancellor Merkel famously contrasted the troubled 
Member States, with ‘Swabian housewives’, who characteristically do not spend more than is in the 
pot. The Swabian ethos is to save first, and then only spend what is saved, because in the long run, one 
cannot live beyond one’s means. On the other side of the justice argument, it could be argued that 
when talking about justice, we are focusing on the people – the ordinary people of Europe, not their 
elite. It is not the ordinary citizen who cooked the books, yet it is precisely the ordinary citizen in the 
poorer Member States who is expected to suffer the consequences. So, there are multiple conflicting 
ideas to what is just and what is unjust. To my mind, this makes the notion of the right of justification 
nonsensical, since there will be multiple ideas as to what precisely we should be compelled to justify. 
Should it be deviation from the four freedoms, should it be the suffering of the Greek, Spanish, 
Portuguese, and Irish? Furthermore, arguments about justice are not merely political, they are party 
political. Therefore, it would be deluded for scholars to assume by some philosophical alchemy they 
shall arrive at a single conception of justice that will satisfy everyone. Academics should not attempt 
to derive a more juristic, less polemical and more apolitical conception of justice. Instead, they should 
assume a more controversial and partisan role. In this regard we should not be afraid of introducing the 
ideas of right-wing and left-wing into our discourse. Apart from being afraid of justice, as Jürgen 
Neyer seems to think, this position might spark the fiercest possible controversy over what is just and 
unjust.  
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Daniela Caruso: Justice and the Regulation of Private Autonomy 
I’d like to address the idea of ‘justice’ in the field of private law harmonization. Talking about justice 
deficit in European law to anyone who has worked on private law harmonization is, today, preaching 
to the converted. It is by now taken for granted that EU private law should reflect social justice 
concerns. This, however, has not always been the case. Things started in 1985 with the Product 
Liability Directive. This was a glorious moment for social justice in private law harmonization: on one 
hand, the new directive fulfilled the needs of the single market by creating a level playing field for 
competing manufacturers throughout the Community; on the other, it promoted a sort of moralization 
of the market by inducing producers to engage in ethical manufacturing. However, this seemingly 
peaceful co-existence between the ideal of justice and the harmonization of private law did not last 
long. Innocence was lost as soon as it became clear that the directive, during the transposition process, 
had prompted lobbyists (pharmaceutical companies and farmers alike) to come to the fore in order to 
reduce their chances of liability. Then, in 2002, the ECJ in González Sánchez v Medicina Asturiana
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declared the directive pre-emptive of higher degrees of protection for the victims of defective 
products. The idea that harmonization would always bring about additional protection for weaker 
parties became, at that point, untenable. 
In the meantime, the Commission had been working on the harmonization of contract law (see eg the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive). Because of the work of social-justice minded academics, contract 
law harmonization has increasingly taken into account the uneven bargaining power of the parties in 
most consumer transactions. This has meant aiming for substantive equality as opposed to formal 
equality, and correcting autonomy with mechanisms for the protection of weaker parties (consumers 
and small enterprises). One could say that the social justice movement in contract law has been highly 
successful, and that EU contract law has completely internalized the agenda of socialization. There is a 
sense, however, in which the movement has become a victim of its own success. When the idea of 
social justice in private law meets the Commission’s aspiration to uniformity, a paradox occurs, and in 
the name of social justice the neoliberal assumption of formal equality comes back to life. In classical 
legal thought, contract law was built on a presumption of parity between formally equal subjects. 
Against this background, acknowledging the structural weakness of certain parties meant realizing 
social justice. And this is exactly the realization that is currently reflected in EU contract law. But, as 
Damjan Kukovec highlights, we are assuming that the trader in the centre is exactly the same as the 
trader in the periphery, and that the consumer in the centre is equally positioned as the consumer in the 
periphery. As a matter of fact, however, Europe is characterized by radically uneven business 
environments and that it is harder for businesses in structurally disadvantaged areas to internalize or 
pass on the costs of regulatory constraints. What is becoming clearer in this postmodern phase of 
private law harmonization is that the enactment of uniform regulatory requirements for market actors 
situated in very different socio-economic contexts is no less worrisome, form the view point of justice, 
than the neoliberal assumption of formal equality between asymmetrically situated contracting parties. 
In the name of socializing private law throughout Europe, harmonization may reproduce the mistakes 
of neo-liberalism.  
There are two things one might do at this point to address this problem. One might give up 
harmonization entirely, and accept that the regulation of contracts – including such things as post-sale 
remedies for consumers – should remain uneven, allowing less stringent regulatory standards for 
structurally weaker business. This option is obviously not realistic. The countries in the socio-
economic periphery of the Union would certainly not want that, because that would label them 
automatically as not offering the same type of guarantees, and would render their products or services 
less appealing. The alternative is to go forward with harmonization in light of social justice concerns. 
After all, it is ethical and expressive for private law throughout Europe to embrace a body of weaker 
party protection. This course of conduct, however, requires conducting extensive empirical 
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investigation and. documenting regularly the costs that uniformity inflicts on producers in the socio-
economic periphery of the Union. Without adequate assessment of, and compensation for, the 
asymmetric impact of uniform contract regulation, EU private law may bring about distributive 
consequences that are the antithesis of social justice.  
Mattias Kumm: The Case of Banks and the Financial Transaction Tax in the EU 
The question I want to address is whether (1) the euro crisis raises issues of justice, if so, (2) what 
exactly they are, and (3) what ‘justice’ requires for resolving them. Firstly, it is not clear whether it is a 
justice issue. There are some who claimed really what went wrong here was a policy choice, a 
constitutional design issue of establishing the European monetary Union in such a way that didn’t 
allow for the EU to react appropriately in the context of asymmetric shocks, and that is what we are 
seeing now. The initial problem was a constitutional design problem, the Euro is not an optimal 
currency under the current design features, and therefore we are suffering the consequences. It was 
bad policy leading to inefficient results. That is one type of analysis. A different type of analysis 
suggests there is a justice issue here but it is along the lines that Danny described, it is somewhere 
between profligate spending of Southern states who could not get their act together, who profited from 
possibilities created by the European monetary union. Cheap access to capital which leads in the end 
to a situation of externalities coupled with failure to pay back debts, creates a ‘justice’ issue by unduly 
affecting others who are not responsible for creating that type of situation. That is one perspective, and 
of course the other perspective is that we shouldn’t focus on the inefficiencies in the political system, 
but on the individuals who are suffering. And so there are duties of solidarity, from which duties of 
justice may follow from that. And so, there is a debate about competing justice claims. 
I find that whole analysis mostly misguided on both sides. I think the core issue is a completely 
different one, the core issue is about regulating the private sector and precluding negative externalities 
from private transactions. So really, the Euro crisis is a banking crisis. From October 2008, to October 
2011, the Commission has authorized 4.5 trillion Euros in State aid subsidies. That’s about 7 times the 
amount we have in the ESM as basic capital. And it’s about 37% of European GDP. That’s how much, 
effectively, was made available at least authorized to flow from the public sector to the private sector 
to save the banks. Now we save the banks for systemic reasons, there are externalities related to bank 
failures, let assume that is correct, economists mostly say that the problem is accurate, that the policy 
solutions selected are correct, I cannot judge that. But let us assume that it is, but if it is, it shows that 
there is a serious regulatory problem here. 
That is that there are externalities to the organization of the financial sector that are not appropriately 
addressed. And that in turn, is a problem that has a lot to do with the European Union. These types of 
problems and the interdependency created, were made possible through a common currency and 
through free movement of capital, guaranteed through EU legal rules. Without them this would not 
have happened. Just to illustrate this, to some perhaps prima facie counter-intuitive thesis, as you 
know, Spain and Ireland at least, those are the clear cases and to some extent now also Slovenia and 
Cyprus are all countries which have actually done better than France or Germany with regard to 
compliance with the Maastricht criteria up until 2007/2008. So, Germany and France were doing 
worse, and only since then the banks in these countries had problems and needed bailing out, that all 
of a sudden the debt problems started. So this is a story true for Spain and Ireland, and even with the 
case of Greece, an exceptional case which doesn’t have much to do with banks, but we may then ask: 
why does Greece become a European problem? Why isn’t it just a Greek problem of not being able to 
pay their debts? The answer is if Greece had just thrown up its arms and said sorry ‘we made mistakes, 
we can no longer pay our debts’, then it would have been the French, German and Austrian 
governments who would have to bail out their banks who bought Greek government bonds. And so, 
there would have been externalities which would not have affected primarily just those who bought 
the bonds, the private investors, but it would have been the public purses of these respective countries. 
So, if we have some degree of solidarity here between Germany, France and Greece, it might be the 
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type of solidarity that is surrounded by interdependence from a political science explanatory point of 
view, rather than ideas of justice. So what should be done about that? What seems to be clear is that 
we have a highly interdependent market, and it is clear that it has to be regulated in a way that 
precludes this type of massive externalities to occur. That is the huge task that has to be addressed, and 
can only be addressed effectively on the European level. And there are directives out there right now, 
recently proposed, trying to address exactly that problem, whether they are good enough or not, is 
another issue. But that is a core piece of the puzzle and it has not been in the news the way it should 
have been. 
Secondly, what should also be clear, is that to the extent that there are costs that remain to be incurred, 
banks to be bailed out, and to the extent that those costs cannot appropriately be fully covered by the 
financial sectors through some type of insurance scheme itself, it has to Europeanized. These are 
genuinely European debts, the idea of leaving this to the place wherever the banks are formally 
registered, is in the context of a European and partially global market, completely arbitrary, and is not 
justifiable. So, in this context we have to accept that bank debts are European debts, and should be 
financed directly, not through inter-state transfers, but through directly through some type of European 
tax, however to be raised. So it is a question of justice to understand that these debts and the 
repayment of these debts are European issues.  
Juri Viehoff: The Choice for Sustainable Solidarity in Europe
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Firstly, what kind of justice do we talk about in the paper? It is socio-economic distributive justice, in 
the Rawlsian spirit. First of all, it is distributive i.e. we can establish the justice of a state of affairs by 
evaluating how well certain goods are being distributed, it is not primarily political justice. And 
second, it is the Rawlsian idea that justice is comprehensive and institutional. This means that the 
justice under consideration within the state is about how collective institutions should be designed and 
how political systems as a whole distribute advantages and benefits from co-operation. It does so 
without addressing how individuals within that system ought to behave in order to behave justly, so it 
takes an institutional and comprehensive view on distributive justice. The second issue relates to the 
content of the paper. What are the three puzzles that we raise? The first one starts off when people say 
there ought to be less distributive policy in the EU. One of the most common arguments here is the 
lack of solidarity in the EU, and that therefore it would be impossible to have such policies. But that 
argument is philosophically puzzling. Why should the absence of some sort of belief amongst people 
exclude questions of whether and when justice applies? The second puzzle deals with agency. We say 
the EU is unique in the sense that directives apply as much to individuals as they apply to collective 
agents, States. If we think about the theories of distributive justice, which of these two perspectives 
ought we to think about? Is justice how the surplus of co-operation should be distributed between 
States? Or must we take a different perspective, in the sense that there is a basic structure that applies 
to individuals, so we substitute the state level with the perspective of the individual. The third puzzle 
is about the role or the relevance of choice in determining the type of socio-economic justice we talk 
about. There is a very influential view regarding global justice (see T. Nagel and M. Blake) which 
holds a fundamental difference between institutions which are voluntary, where people have the ability 
to consent to the institution’s authority, and those where they don’t. It’s only the second type of 
institution that raises concerns of egalitarian social economic justice in terms of how people fare 
relatively, rather than absolutely. If this is a sound argument then we could establish that there is a 
requirement of distributive justice within States but not between States in the EU. If we consider the 
EU from the collective agent view, it might still be considered something that is voluntarily engaged 
by each state, and therefore, distributive justice just doesn’t apply.  
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How is this conception of justice and the puzzles mentioned relevant for what has been said so far? 
Two points: the first one is on the relationship between democracy and justice, and the debate between 
Danny and Jürgen. I think one corollary of the view that we present is that justice is different from 
legitimacy. Justice how we understand it, refers to how people fare. Legitimacy, on the other hand 
dispenses of the question when the actions of authority are justified, i.e. when does the law have 
authority. These are very different questions, and we can’t collapse one into the other. And of course 
democracy is a means to make it the case that institutions have authority and are normatively 
legitimate. It is not so obvious then that democracy is a requirement of justice.  
The second point is on the sociological motivation and consequences of disagreement. I think the 
correct Rawlsian understanding of disagreement is that disagreement only matters provided it is 
reasonable. So when we think about considerations of justice, we must first evaluate whether or not 
the people who disagree, disagree reasonably, and then we must construct institutions that are 
legitimate in this light. 
Discussion Following the Third Session 
 
- Agustín J. Menéndez: I have two different kinds of problems with Kumm’s paper: empirical and 
normative.On the empirical side, there are at least three problems. First, you associate the banking 
mess and the Euro. The peculiar way in which banking was affected by asymmetric EMU has 
made of European banks the most leveraged in the world, and has created banks that are too big to 
be bailed out, given the relation of assets to GDP. But unfortunately, facts are very stubborn, and a 
similar baking mess has happened in many other countries, including the United States and the 
United Kingdom (and even Canada, despite the myth of soundness of Canadian banks). The 
banking mess is but part of the financial crisis, a crisis which is in its turn one of the perhaps five 
key building blocks of the present crisis. Which is first and foremost a crisis of capitalism as we 
know it, the neoliberal capitalism that developed as a solution to the structural crisis of postwar 
capitalism in the 1970s. Asymmetric EMU may have determined the peculiar virulency of the 
crisis in Europe, but the causes of the crisis cannot be circumscribed to EMU. If there had not 
been monetary union in Europe, but capital would have been unleashed as it has been in the 80s 
and 90s, European banks (and very especially banks of surplus countries within the Eurozone) 
would have recycled their profits in different toxic products, increased their leverage, while 
national regulators would have not realised the contingent liabilities the state of incorporation was 
incurring until it was too late. 
Second, you follow the mainstream “anti-austerity” arguments when you claim that in the cases 
of Spain and Ireland, the culprit of the fiscal crisis of the two countries are the banks. The 
gargantuan deficits result from socialising the losses of the financial sector. Indeed, the public 
sector was extremely virtuous before the crisis, with very low public debt (in both countries 
under 40% GDP and decreasing before the crisis) and with balanced or close to balanced budgets 
for many years. This claim is on the surface of it impeccable. But it misses the obvious fact that 
the Spanish and Irish socio-economic model was one made dependent on unsustainable 
economic activities: real estate and banking. Blaming the banks after 2007 does not take into 
account a vital part of the picture: That the state fostered a socio-economic model which was an 
accident happening. And more to our present point, this model was fostered because it provided 
easy access to tax revenue (the revenue generated by construction and real estate speculation), 
tax revenue which was used to reduce taxes over sustainable economic activities, thus creating a 
hidden revenue deficit; camouflaged until the unsustainable binge would collapse, that is. More 
damagingly, the structural effects of this socio-economic model was not only the spoilage of 
natural resources, but the undermining of many sustainable economic activities. Not only real 
estate crowded out other types of economic activities (with more stable perspectives, but with 
much lower returns in the short run), but a prolonged speculative binge sent fully distorted 
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signals to students and to those already in the labour market. Access to tons of cheap money 
recycled from the surplus economies of the Eurozone core pushed financial institutions out of 
financial intermediation with a view to ensure the reproduction of the economy. The gargantuan 
deficits of Spain and Ireland since 2008 are not the result only of rescuing the banks, but the 
delayed payments associated to the speculative transformation of their economies. So Spain and 
Ireland were actually only doing good on paper. The debt that has emerged since was already 
being made during the boom years. This speculative financiarisation of the economy is not the 
result of banksters capturing the political process, but it is a strategy of adaptation to the 
international division of labour within capitalism, a division of labour rendered even more acute 
by EMU, but of which EMU is only a later part. Again, this is not only a problem of the banks, it 
is a structural problem of the economic model, the division of labor between the northern chord, 
(which is hyper-competitive and exports capital) and the southern chord (who spend the money), 
and Benelux (that is the tax heaven). 
Thirdly, you say we have a very integrated financial market in Europe. Well, we had. 
Transnational financial activities have shrunk dramatically, and indeed if we can keep of talking 
of a European financial system is because the ECB, at different times, has either underpinned 
such market, or become a substitute for it (clearly between October 2008 to mid 2009, and then 
again from mid 2010, when the sovereign debt crisis closed the door of many European banks to 
the money markets, especially the American money markets which serve as global 
intermediaries). This empirical observation should lead us to rethink indeed what is the 
European Union actually become. While the rhetorics of the “market economy” and the “free 
market” are alive and kicking (especially in the ECJ), the fact of the matter is that the allocation 
of capital, which is fundamental in any modern market economy, is not subject to market forces, 
but is fully intervened in by the ECB. The virtually unlimited refinancing at low rates which are 
applied to all banks, together with the virtual elimination of any requirement concerning the 
quality of the collateral, has led not only to massive rents accruing to European banks, but to six 
years in which access to credit has not much to do with markets. Either what the ECB has done 
is regarded positively (in which case we should really doubt about market allocation of capital) 
or negatively (in which case we should contest the whole steering of the crisis). To portray six 
years of intervention as a temporary measure is simply disingenuous. 
On the normative side, it seems to me that there are considerable gaps between your rather 
abstract if not rarified premises and the very specific conclusions. Consider your claim that 
‘justice requires we mutualise European bank debt.’ How can you be sure? Even if we were to 
agree to a properly fleshed out case for the existence of solidaristic obligations extending to all 
Europeans as European citizens (a case you do not flesh out, but merely postulate, although I 
think it can be done, and perhaps it should be done), why should mutualisation of debt the way 
out? Mutualising debt may dilute the problem, but clearly favours rentiers over workers. It could 
be argued that both of them will be better off than with the present policy of muddling through, 
but that would require taking seriously the amounts of debt being socialised. I have serious 
doubts Hamilton would have been so keen to go federal if the piles of debt would have been 
equal to the present European ones. But even then, the question remains of whether there are 
other alternatives to actually socialising the debt. We could follow strategies which combine the 
actual policies of ordoliberal Erhard or liberist Einaudi after the war, meaning, shrinking the pile 
of debt through the exchange rates of monetary reform, or through benign neglect towards 
inflation. Or we could take seriously the cancellation of debt, a policy that could certainly be 
articulated in much better ways that the so-called private sector involvement in Greece or in 
Cyprus. Measures which could be combined, and in my view should be combined, with the 
nationalisation of banks, much as the far from radical Hyman Minsky argued for (a tendency that 
would revert to policies that were largely consensual at some points of the postwar period in 
some countries). My point is not to prejudge one option or the other, but to reiterate with a twist 
Danny’s (and Waldron’s) question, why should your option be the just option and not the others? 
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We disagree about this, and there is no obvious way how we can decide over a scholarly 
workshop what is to be done. It is not for the cosmopluralists to decide on the basis of their 
wisdom, but for we the people to decide. 
- Michael Wilkinson: Mattias raises a very important point on the banking crisis. I share some of the 
reservations that this is the dominant issue. But putting this to one side, even if you are right and 
the core issue is about regulating the private sector, I am incredulous if you do not find this is a 
political issue, because of course politics is always about the question of regulating the private 
sector. (Mattias interjects: ‘but who said it is not a political issue?’). Well, you began by saying ‘it 
could be a problem of constitutional design, which you rejected, you said it could be a political 
issue in the way Danny has expressed it, which you… (Mattias again interjects: ‘it’s a justice 
issue.’) ok, but it is also a political issue (Mattias: ‘yes’). In which case, you are not giving an 
alternative to Danny’s problem, if the problem is about what degree to regulate the private sector. 
But, there is another point, which is looking at what has happened. Take the fiscal compact, where 
now you have surveillance over national parliaments, and their budgetary autonomy, so it has 
become quite deeply a constitutional issue, however much your solution might be an attractive 
one, we have to face the reality, that it will be now an issue of constitutionalism as well. 
- Gareth Davies: I see three kinds of questions about justice. One is – does this term add anything to 
the discussion about legitimacy and so on? And if so, then what exactly do we mean by justice? 
And even if we could answer that question, and even if we could reach some kind of consensus on 
certain elements of justice, the third question makes me very nervous, and it touches on what 
Danny and Mattias were talking about. The question is, what policy considerations follow from 
our conception of justice? And this kind of question seems to me, basically impossible. On the one 
hand, because it’s very complex, hopelessly complex. On the question of redistribution – it is 
never just individual redistribution, it’s the philosophy of the system. So justice is more than the 
situation one is looking at. More importantly than this, if one applies justice to policy, one is 
inherently thinking of a substantive concept of justice, in which consequences or effects become 
part of it, a policy which might be just and works as intended might not be just if it does not work 
and leads to more human cost and injustice. So making a claim that a policy is necessitated by a 
view of justice is really making a claim about effects, about social and economic effects, about 
what would happen if we do this with the banks, or if we had this private law…and as lawyers, we 
make our arguments about social and economic issues, but what exactly are we doing? We make 
empirical claims about social sciences, political sciences, economic sciences…and I just ask 
myself, how can we make claims like that? 
- Danny Nicol: I want to make a remark to Juri Viehoff regarding your comment that disagreements 
have to be reasonable, I wonder how on Earth does one decide what is a reasonable disagreement 
and what is an unreasonable disagreement. Hopefully, the various issues, which I flagged up 
where people disagree about the justice implications were reasonable. But how do you judge what 
is an unreasonable disagreement, and if you do have that prerequisite doesn’t it invite an inbuilt 
conservatism? But if one deviates too much from the status quo, is one having an ‘unreasonable 
disagreement’? 
- Mattias Kumm in response to Agustín J. Menéndez: So, Agustín, on one point is right and on 
another point is completely wrong. I think, to put it carefully, it’s not very helpful to talk about a 
crisis of capitalism without looking closely at which rules are at play and create a type of situation 
that we have now. It is true, it is not just a European phenomenon, it goes to global governance. It 
goes to a certain deregulatory ideology, which played a role in the Lehman crisis with the 
evolution of the Glass-Steagall Act,
21
 the way that supervisor institutions are structured and the 
role of banks within them etc. So you can really list a number of specific things, and in turn enact 
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rules, which address these issues. In such case you still have a capitalist system in many ways, a 
market-based system, but it would not be characterized by externalities and injustice problems. 
Now that is the claim, there are those who claim that there is something wrong with capitalism 
that it is endemic to crises, and what you really have to do is abolish the system and replace it with 
something else, but that seems to me to be the wrong way of approaching it. A closer analysis of 
what went wrong, and what the rules are is likely to be more productive.  
Secondly, I think you are right when you say that all types of other solutions than the one which 
I suggested, might equally be just or more just. So I do not want to be nailed down to the 
particular solution I suggested. What I do want to be nailed down to and express as clearly as I 
could, was that it is wrong to think that justice issues play out along the lines that Danny 
described (but did not necessarily subscribe to), and my claim is that this is simply the wrong 
debate to have. This is a deeply reactionary debate; it posits one country, the rich against the 
poor, on a country based level, instead of looking at this as a systemic problem of the financial 
sector. And I think, on that level, we are likely to agree. So, yes, there is a justice issue here, but 
it is a different justice issue than the one I identified to Danny, so this policy issue is a justice 
issue, but a different one than described by Danny. It is not between Germany and Greece, it is 
more about understanding who pays for the debts of banks to a significant extent. Not the only 
question, but the significant question.  
- Juri Viehoff: To respond to Danny, I think it is important to distinguish different ways in which 
disagreement matters for how we think about institutions and about justice and legitimacy. I think 
the way in which you invoke Waldron in your papers shows that we need to talk about reasonable 
disagreements as opposed to any type of disagreement. The point is that the response that you 
give, i.e. that democracy can serve as a kind of solution to the problem of disagreement (make it 
acceptable to persons being ruled) only works if certain types of views are excluded. Democracy 
can only render political decisions acceptable to a person where that person already accepts certain 
fundamental assumptions, most importantly that we see each other as equal citizens, even when 
we disagree. It is not clear how democracy could make disagreement acceptable for people who 
hold crazy or vicious views, e.g. “I should be king” etc. To serve the normative purpose of making 
political decisions acceptable to individuals, some shared basis must already exist between them. 
- Suryapratim Roy: I was wondering whether picking up from Danny, as well as from Gareth, it is 
possible to argue that justice not only does violence to the notion of expressive democracy, but 
that violence is necessary for legitimizing the stability of institutions in Europe. John Gardner in 
his review of Sen’s ‘Idea of Justice’22 says it’s a great book with an unfortunate title. So justice 
could be viewed as a floating category populated by institutional preferences; we have seen today 
that substantive justice could mean the freedom to take a Ryanair flight, or the requirement to 
include sustainability in well-being. Even procedural justice does not have a claim to correctness 
free from institutional subjectivity – you might have a right to be heard, but not a right to a 
suspension of institutionally defined standards of reasonableness while exercising such rights. 
Justice seems to be a mechanism used by institutions to prevent empirical anarchy and 
maintaining their status quo. So to go back to Jürgen’s presentation, perhaps the challenge is not 
really appreciating normative issues in a methodologically sound way, but to have the ability to 
contest the hermeneutics and implicit institutional preferences in any methodology used to make 
decisions in the pursuit of justice. So that is why justice could be viewed as a rhetorical category 
that is politically charged and is potentially a violent one. 
- Joanne Scott to Mattias Kumm and Juri Viehoff: Do you think it makes any difference to the 
capacity of justice, that some of the recent Eurozone measures have taken the form of international 
treaties rather than EU instruments, because then you are dealing with an intergovernmental 
mechanism, and a particular lack of democracy in that case, parliaments (national and European) 
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play less of a role, and indeed if one is looking for solidarity or redistribution, there is less of a 
capacity for that if you’re dealing with a treaty rather than an EU instrument? 
- Neil Walker: Danny, I think the fact that questions of justice are all politically contested, which I 
agree with, doesn't make the language of justice redundant. Looking at it from the other direction, 
one might also say that all sorts of political questions relate to questions of justice. And maybe the 
EU isn’t always the best example. I come from a part of the United Kingdom, which is having a 
debate about independence, and will do so over the next two years. This raises all sorts of 
questions that are political questions, but are also questions of justice, about whether this is a 
correct community which should have control over its own destiny given the associative ties, 
given the practical ties of existing political arrangements etc. But also even in terms of substantive 
political debate, don’t we all – unless we subscribe to a really high agonistic conception of 
political – don’t we all think that politics is somehow framed through some type of register of 
public reason, where people are trying to make up arguments which are general arguments about 
the whole community and appealable to the whole community? They may be very different 
arguments, but they all often also explicitly make claims of justice as a whole. So the point is not 
necessarily that when you talk of reasonable disagreement, all one sees is the fact of disagreement. 
It should, by the way, be reasoned disagreement – not necessarily reasonable disagreement. And 
we all at least have an implicit sense that within that reasoning there is an appeal to different 
conceptions of justice, rather than simply different conceptions of self-interest. 
- Carole Lyons: Two quick pragmatic interventions, the first to Mattias. Based on your (assumed) 
rhetorical question – why is the Greek problem a European problem? One answer might be that 
one can perceive the Treaties’ role as expressing a kind of vow - “in sickness and in health”, hence 
the whole point of the EU: a ‘closer union’. The Greek problem is European because it is written 
into the Treaties. The second question is, if we are feeling our way towards a conception of how 
much of a justice deficit there is in the EU, when did that deficit, if there is one, begin? Not with 
the banking crisis, not with Viking and Laval but arguably much earlier. A word which comes to 
mind in this context is “fish”. Particularly, the fisherman of Peterhead – (North East Scotland) – 
how long have they been breaking up their boats? Well in Peterhead since 1973, but in other parts 
of the EU since a lot earlier. Where is the justice in that? How far back do we go? 
- Fernanda Nicola: I just want to make a methodological point about the conceptual shift of this 
panel, dealing with substantive rather than procedural justice. It seems to me that in order to grasp 
this substantive notion, we are thinking about injustice, and so we are trying to figure out where is 
the injustice and between whom in the context of Eurozone crisis. Injustice emerges between 
bankers and consumers, capital and workers, right and left, or even between centre and periphery 
in Europe. Substantive justice appears as a moving notion changing in place and time. For instance 
in European private law those jurists who were creating the social market agenda were at the 
periphery – now they are coming closer to the centre. Likewise, the freedom of movement of 
workers and the citizenship of the European Union are legal doctrines that have dramatically 
changed their meaning in the last ten years. In these changing contexts it is hard to pinpoint 
substantive injustice – this is a moving target, which we have to follow in different places and 
times. 
- Daniel Augenstein: Just a quick point to Danny, picking up on what Neil said. You move very 
quickly from the realization that normative concepts are contested to the claim that they are 
normatively meaningless. I wonder how your distinction between ‘the left’ and ‘the right’ – could 
withstand your own critique. The concern I want to raise is that you might end up in the position 
where all you have left to say is something like ‘let’s find some friends and try to get it our way’. 
This is a deeply conservative position, ironically, because at the end of the day, it legitimizes the 
status quo and disenables critique.  
- Jürgen Neyer: I like Neil’s intervention on politics being intrinsically contestable, and I think that 
is even more important to take into account regarding democracy. Democracy is about permanent 
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conversation, it can’t be anything else. And therefore talking about justice and connecting that to 
democracy must always be an invitation of conversation. That must be at the heart of a good 
concept of justice. Therefore, I think there are multiple meanings of justice, that is true, but there 
are some meanings of justice that are more or less compatible with the notion of democracy. And 
the right to justification, I think, has as its strength that it lies at the heart of a republican 
understanding of democracy, as a discourse among the people. Also, this picks up on a previous 
question, what is the function of law? And how does law relate to justice? In this sense, European 
laws is helpful to look at. It is basically not about allowing or preventing issues, it is about 
structuring political discourse among the Member States and non-State actors, it provides criteria 
of rationality. It is telling what kind of reasons to use, what are good reasons, what are bad 
reasons. Therefore, EU law is basically an invitation to a structured discourse of justification. I 
think it is a helpful construct to understand what legitimacy is in the EU. It is a real democratic 
understanding of what justice is. 
- Danny Nicol: I think there has been a misunderstanding. I don’t think that justice is a normatively 
redundant idea nor is the language of justice redundant. My view is simply that justice is 
something we argue about, and that there is no one single formula which can somehow represent 
justice, whether it is the Treaty of Rome, or some philosophy of Rawls or whatever. I agree that 
justice is endemically controversial. We can go back to 1973, but I am sure we could go back to 
1957, and well before then. As for the value of the right of justification in structuring political 
discourse, my concern would be that the structure itself would be controversial and go one way 
rather than another. That needs to be considered.  
- Mattias Kumm to Carole Lyons: It wasn’t just being rhetorical to say ‘is the Greek problem a 
European issue?’, because we can look at this as a set of private interactions, we can look at this as 
the Greek state looking on the capital markets for somebody willing to lend money for interest, 
and then those who bet on Greece being able to repay are the ones, who, in this case, unfortunately 
place a bad bet – and in the end they lose their money. Or they at least strike a deal and still lose a 
significant amount money. That is how it goes. That is normally how contracts are meant to 
function, with minimum externalities between the parties. It is between the parties that make 
choices. That would have been possible in the case of state defaults. Now the reason why that 
didn’t work in the case of Greece is that there are so many other stakeholders – banks in particular 
– which would have required refinancing, i.e bailing out, so there was strong government pressure 
on Greece not to default: a very important part of the equation, not the whole part, but an 
important part. This also allows to go back to the point Gareth made, that without being 
sophisticated about theoretical constructions, to use the language of justice, there are certain types 
of harms that are relevantly easy, at least to identify prima facie, when raising justice concerns, 
when there are significant sums being transferred to people who, under normal contractual 
accounts, would lose them. So shareholders of banks, bondholders of banks, managers of banks do 
not lose as much because it is taken from the tax payers and directly transferred to the banks. That 
is what has happened. That doesn’t mean it is necessarily unjust, but it does suggest that it is 
something you want to have a damn good justification for, and to make sure this doesn’t happen 
again. In that sense at least, this is a relatively easy case to use justice in a way that, in the end, it 
requires us to conceive of complicated regulatory answers. But we need to mobilize first, and to 
that we need political actors who employ public reasons, who identify what the problem is and 
make arguments as to why it is important to push back on the organized interests in this case, and 
establish the type of rules to avoid letting this happen again.  
- Juri Viehoff: Two very quick points. The first one on the question of treaties v intergovernmental 
agreements, it might make a difference for legitimacy, but I don’t know how it would make a 
difference for justice – it might make a difference as to contestability. The second point, in a very 
general way, there is some value in talking about how the benefits of social co-operation should be 
distributed, and what states of affairs we ought to bring about. I think these are substantive 
questions of distributive justice. A different question is how we should come to decide what we 
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do: what the procedures are to which we come to distribute. I think to define justice in terms of 
justification makes it very difficult to not go back and forth, asking – is this about democracy or is 
this about substantive conceptions of justice? 
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Fourth Session: Territoriality, Periphery and the Political 
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott: Two Visions of Justice in the EU 
Where I depart from many of the conference papers is that the focus of my work has been on injustice, 
as much as on justice. This derives from reasons which have been already explored during the last 
session in the discussion of Danny’s paper: namely, that there exist a myriad of concepts of justice 
available and that, in one way or another, the EU gives voice to them all – substantive or procedural 
justice, distributive or corrective justice, uniform concept or plurality of justices. The many differences 
between member state legal systems, and their varied attitudes towards, for example, redistribution of 
wealth, render an overarching concept of justice for the EU seemingly unattainable. Indeed, the 
complex, pluralist landscape of EU law and governance, with its fragmented lines of authority and 
near invisible accountabilities, seems to render injustice all the more likely. So, it is difficult to find a 
single, overarching theory of justice appropriate for the very complex organism that is the EU. In some 
earlier work I highlighted the rule of law, or critical legal justice as I have preferred to recast it, as one 
possible common denominator for justice in the EU.
23
 This is a specifically legal notion of justice, 
which takes account of the fact that law has a particular relationship with justice. As lawyers, we have 
this imperative to do justice. You cannot have the luxury of the philosopher who will sit back and 
think about it. You have to actually act. So, I looked to a legal concept of justice, and I argued that the 
rule of law should operate as a lowest common denominator as a form of justice in the EU. 
I am not going to go into many examples of where I believe the EU to be lacking in the rule of law. I 
believe there are many. However, we have just been talking about the Eurozone, and that provides a 
good example of the absence or deficit of the rule of law. Steve Peers, for example, recently 
commented of Eurozone measures that they ‘failed the test of transparency, because of their near total 
complexity. Unreadable, they are scattered across dozens of primary or secondary sources.’24 
 Now, the problem with looking only to a legal concept of justice such as the rule of law as a lowest 
common denominator is that it sets only a basic or minimal standard for justice in the EU. On the other 
hand, justice in a broader sense may be so elusive as to be an ideal or utopian. This is where and why I 
shift my focus to injustice, arguing that it is the diagnosis of injustice that is itself crucial, as justice is 
more likely to move people in its absence, rather than as an academic or rhetorical exercise that fails to 
convince. In order to reinforce this argument I have used images, some of which I distribute here. The 
first illustration is of a very familiar type of statue of justice – with the sword and scales, not 
particularly emotive or captivating, nor anything unfamiliar. In contrast, I use another image which 
you may have seen before, it is the work of a Danish sculptor, Jens Galschiøt and it is entitled The 
Survival of the Fattest.
25
 It was displayed in Copenhagen harbour next to the internationally famous 
Little Mermaid statue at the time of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. It depicts a grossly 
obese European ‘Justitia’ or more properly injustice, actually bearing the scales of justice in her right 
hand, being carried on the shoulders of a starving African man. Galschiøt himself said this represents 
the self-righteousness of the rich world which sits on the backs of the poor. In the picture here you can 
also see the backdrop of chimneys billowing out pollution and smoke, ironically making their point on 
the Climate Change Conference. I believe this work conveys its message far more effectively and 
memorably than so many speeches of politicians, or musings of philosophers. A turn to Art is not, I 
believe, misplaced in our investigation of justice and its relation to law, given the important role that 
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visual images can play in the communication and investigation and exploration of legal ideas in their 
cultural context. So, the point I am making is that it is very difficult to agree on a theory of justice, 
particularly one that can apply in the highly complex concrete circumstances of the EU. This contrasts 
with the readiness with which we experience injustice, with the immediacy of emotion that injustice 
provokes. It is injustice that motivates and propels action. Hence illustration 2 seems far more 
compelling than Illustration 1.  
Sen’s work has already been mentioned in the conference. Sen in his recent book Idea of Justice 
suggests that we focus on injustice. For Sen, our starting point should be the reflection that our 
determination of what justice requires in a particular situation is initially motivated by feelings of 
injustice. We are left with a sense of injustice as a motivator, a call to resistance, instilling us with a 
sense of responsibility to some sort of action. I think there is value in taking this approach, because we 
can agree a certain situation is unjust even although we may not agree on the reasons why. There has 
been quite a lot of talk about Rawls today, but where I have been trying to turn to with my work has 
been examples of non-ideal philosophy, such as Sen’s work, which does not take as its premise some 
sort of fully worked or even utopian philosophical theory. I am interested by the work of those 
philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment - David Hume and Adam Smith – who start with the 
theory of emotions as a premise for justice, because the emotions rather than reason are able to provide 
motivation for action. Our sense of justice is derived from our sense of injustice, which in turn 
develops from a complex constellation of emotions, which provide a psychological basis from which 
moral theories may emerge. Reason and emotion are therefore compounded and inseparable, and work 
together in the formation of moral judgements, providing a motivation for moral action in a way that 
reason alone (in the cool and disengaged form it finds in rational philosophy) is unable to do. The key 
point here is that an account of justice which acknowledges the role played by the emotions in 
identifying injustice, and the contribution of our emotions to our reasoned ethical judgements, not only 
more accurately represents the nature of our ethical thought, but is better placed to motivate citizens.  
There is a lot of value in taking this approach, because within the EU one of the problems is 
motivation. There exists a motivational deficit which can turn people to almost a nihilist 
disengagement, and so it is very important, I think, to search for what causes it, and start with injustice 
and the emotions – even if we subsequently temper our theory with reason. 
Antonia Layard: Creating a Europe of Places 
I concentrate on Spatial Justice, or thinking about justice in geographical terms. What I intend to do is 
talk about justice in geographical terms and using geographical techniques: there is no single 
normative claim in my paper; it is rather a series of reflections and questions. My first claim is that 
spatial justice is highly situated, and uses three broad techniques of legal geography: (i) Law 
constitutes society and space, and society and space constitutes law. This is the starting point in legal 
geography and draws from the law and society tradition, combining both doctrinal abstraction and 
‘law on the streets’. Legal geography often works from the site up. (ii) Legal geography incorporates 
geographical assumptions of plurality and multiplicity integrating them into legal analysis. This is both 
a conceptual device and a guiding assumption. Legal geographers join with other critical scholars in 
their starting point of critiquing unitary, fixed and (above all) neutral understandings of ‘the law’. (iii) 
The techniques of scaling, place and space. Place-making activities (at whatever scale) are primarily 
socio-spatial rather than legal acts, even though they take legal form so that they are (as socio-legal 
analysts suggest) mutually constitutive. For example, when the EU was formed, this was a social, 
political, cultural, racial, religious decision that took legal form. The context influenced the law and 
the legal form affected the form of the Union itself (with fixed borders, accession by Member States 
(rather than regions), assumptions of legal consistency and so on (Walker, 2010)). These are multiple 
acts, at multiple scales, achieved in multiple ways. 
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I have three questions: (i) what is European legal space? The technique of scaling may be used here, 
we know scaling is a conscious political and legal act, and so is the EU, as it is not ontologically 
given, but socially constructed. In EU law we often think of jurisdiction at the EU level, the Member 
State level, and at the individual level, but geographers argue that it is far more dynamic; it is much 
more intertwined. For example, when Damian talks about justice, is EU justice different from any 
other forms of justice? Mattias mentions the arguments about tax that can also be seen in spatial terms 
people feel a greater sense of obligation in some quarters, (ii) In relation to multiplicities, we have EU 
Spaces rather than EU space. So we have EU justices, rather than EU justice, depending largely on 
justice consciousness similar to legal consciousness which may be uneven, and (iii) there are objects 
and subjects of justice. For example non-discrimination may require some amount of reciprocity.  
Damjan Kukovec: Justice and the European Periphery: Taking Change Seriously - The Discourse 
of Justice and the Reproduction of the Status Quo 
 
The discourse of justice is to be welcomed as an opportunity for a change in legal thinking. However, 
there are also dangers in the discourse of justice and it is these dangers that I would like to address. 
The universal discourse of justice can, rather than delivering change, entrench existing hierarchies. It 
is because there is no human situation in which injustice of some kind or another does not exist, that 
"justice" as a term makes any sense at all. The empty notion of justice as a rhetorical move assists 
particular demands to be able to claim universality. The focus of my work has been the hierarchical 
relationship between the EU’s center and the EU’s periphery. As I have argued on the basis of the 
discussion surrounding the Laval and Viking cases, in matters of social and goods dumping,brand 
power, antitrust, state aid, private law and other internal market regulation, the actors of the periphery 
– workers, consumers, companies etc. are in a different structural situation than actors of the center.  
However, the universal argument of the Union, the argument of uniformity, is the particular argument 
of the center. In other words, it is assumed in the legal discourse that throughout the European Union, 
a company, worker or consumer of the center is in the same structural situation as a company, worker 
or consumer of the periphery. The demands of the center, the universalized claims, are therefore strong 
and the claims of the periphery, their social or free movement claims, are either invisible or weak and 
foreclosed from operating powerfully.  
 
No theory has one necessary realization and no theory of justice has one necessary realization. My fear 
is that the realization of theories of justice discussed in universal terms will be carried out according to 
the existing conceptualization of harm, from the perspective of the center, and reinforce the already 
stronger, visible claims in the legal discourse. In the case of the EU legal discourse, this would 
reinforce the social and free movement claims of the center.  
 
In the context of social justice, "justice" is often synonymous with the strengthening of social, labor 
and human rights components of our legal thinking. Justice, poverty alleviation, solidarity and 
advancement of the concerns of the marginalized are then understood to follow from a stronger 
enforcement of social and socioeconomic rights or from other social or value-laden components of our 
thinking. However, as actors of the periphery are differently situated than actors of the center, the 
question that we should be asking is not whether to give a preference to social or to economic 
considerations. The question that we should be asking is whose social and whose economic 
considerations are we giving preference to.  
 
The current legal consciousness, which follows thinking in terms of giving preference either to the 
(universalized existing) social or to the (universalized existing) economic/autonomy/free movement 
considerations reflects a conceptual understanding of the world, the mode of thinking I have called 
“the conceptualism of Contemporary legal thought”. The dichotomy of neoliberal laissez faire policy 
and protectionism, and the assumption of their inherent link with either free movement or social 
considerations, clouds a conscious construction of the Union and prevents us from thinking about 
alternative constructions of the European legal structure. Many analytical mistakes flow from this 
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conceptualism, some reproducing the mistakes of laissez-faire reasoning, what I have called “social 
lochnerism”. Moreover, claims of autonomy are falsely solely associated with economic growth while 
social claims are falsely only associated with protection against externalities of growth. Such thinking 
also leads to the conclusion of progressive lawyers that what needs to be fought is “the market” or “the 
goal of free competition". According to such thinking, more “justice” thus means less free movement; 
the argument of justice should fight free movement considerations. However, as the interplay of the 
universal social and free movement considerations is played out in the understanding of harm 
understood from the perspective of the center, the externalities of the legal discourse are often borne 
by the periphery.  
 
The constitutional and pluralist debates too often perceive the EU legal system as an order implicitly 
containing “the principle of constitutional tolerance”, “the logic of inclusion” and ideals of the good 
society, ignoring the dynamics of power in the Union and its externalities. Many calls for more justice 
coincide with constitutional calls for more accountability, more democracy, more participation and 
representation. These calls, made in universal terms and oblivious of structural differences within the 
Union, are calls for a better implementation of existing thinking, rather than for a transformation of the 
existing legal discourse. As a result, such calls for justice promise to entrench the existing state of 
affairs, rather than offer a transformative potential.  
 
Claims of actors of the periphery are often lost in the existing interplay of social and 
economic/autonomy/free movement considerations. The static relationship between center and 
periphery can only be properly understood as a set of freedoms and prohibitions or legal entitlements. 
In the reproduction of these entitlements, understanding of harm, as well as the doctrines and the 
concepts we use play a vital role. The existing entitlements should be rearranged if change and social 
transformation is to be taken seriously. 
Fernanda Nicola: Substantive Equality and Territorial Justice in the EU 
My presentation introduces the concept of territorial justice to do three things: (i) This is not to 
romanticise the local, but to use the concept of territory and geographic space as a legal realist tool. 
From a legal realist standpoint, a territorial focus allows us to view federalism not as a discussion 
between two institutions in power, but rather a trade-off between various actors. (ii) Territory has been 
used as a proxy to address poverty and redistribution in EU cohesion policy which attempts to balance 
inequalities brought about by the common market. However, as I have written elsewhere, these 
policies have been unsuccessful in tailoring their interventions to a particular territory or the regions 
involved in cohesion policies. (iii) Finally a territorial justice perspective allows us to contextualise 
concepts of distributive justice in EU law. In my presentation I will focus on the first and third issue. 
First, in introducing the concept of space, the existing EU federal tensions are no longer limited to two 
actors, namely the Member States and the Union, but rather, they are reconceptualised as a trade-off of 
power and resources among various local, national and supranational actors.  
Second, the notion of territorial justice helps us to understand where an inequality lies and justify a 
redistributive policy. This approach is in line with Amartya Sen’s contribution to John Rawls’ notions 
of liberty and autonomy in the distribution of primary goods. In fact Sen’s capabilities approach 
reveals the gap between the opportunity for primary goods and what people really enjoy because of 
their preferences. In a similar way, by territorializing some of the Court of Justice's decisions on the 
free movement of people, spatial location determines how primary goods are enjoyed and by which 
groups. A territorial justice approach to EU law accounts for the social realization of each, differently 
situated, group of individuals rather than tying them to decisions based on abstract legal principles and 
institutional demands. 
Sen’s Idea of Justice raises a new perspective on the notion of fairness in the creation of institutions. 
This should take into account the difference principle of both economic and social capabilities. In 
Debating Europe’s Justice Deficit: The EU, Swabian Housewives, Rawls, and Ryanair 
33 
departing from Rawls, Sen says there is a gap between what is the primary good and how people can 
take advantage of the such good. Depending on where you are, and how you are differently located to 
enjoy primary goods. In my example the way you are spatially situated (periphery, centre, north, south 
etc.) will determine how you can enjoy certain goods or not.  
Agustín J. Menéndez: Political and Territorial Justice in the Light of the Constitutional 
Foundations of Redistribution in the EU 
Five minutes for five theses. First thesis, political justice finds its institutional embodiment in the 
Social and Democratic Rechtsstaat, which is the peculiar combination and reconciliation of three 
regulatory ideals: the rule of law, not men; the democratic state structured and shaped by democratic 
politics; and the social, welfare state. As I have just said, that form of state results from a certain 
constitutional tradition and history. 
Second thesis, the European Communities played a key supporting role in the transformation of the 
regulatory ideal of the Social and Democratic Rechtsstaat into real institutions and policies. European 
integration rendered possible the shift from diplomacy to transnational and supranational law, creating 
the conditions under which public institutions recovered power from cartels and other forms of private 
power. European integration helped overcome the democratic deficit intrinsic to a system of nation-
states. European integration created the structural stability which rendered possible the sustained 
economic recovery of the trente glorieuses. 
Third thesis, The European Communities have elided and mutated since the early eighties and are now 
acting also in ways that undermine the stability of the Social and Democratic Rechtsstaat. For one, the 
conception of economic freedoms as metafundamental rights (economic freedoms breached by 
obstacles, not only by discriminatory treatment) is the structural nemesis of the Social and Democratic 
state. For two, the unfinished constitutional season started in the 1980s has led to executive 
constitutionalism, a constitutionalism where far from impeccable changes to the Treaties from a 
democratic perspective are justified in the name of urgency, as was the case during the Lisbon process. 
For three, asymmetric economic and monetary union has become a constitutional Frankenstein that 
has forced to set aside constitutional law—both national constitutions and Treaties—and moved us 
further into executive constitutionalism and executive federalism (the Fiscal Compact being the 
ultimate example in that regard), and has pushed the unravelling of the fabric of the social state, a 
process well advanced in the periphery of the Eurozone.  
Fourth thesis, the present socio-economic constitution of the European Union is plagued by a peculiar 
mix of individualistic subjective rights and communitarian redistribution. On the one hand, economic 
freedoms are presented as the institutionalisation of commutative justice; but they are much more than 
that; they are trump cards that prevent any democratically decided form of distributive justice. When 
the activities that constitute tax dodging are protected as part of the breadth and scope of freedom of 
establishment or free movement of capital (Centros, Cadbury, Marks and Spencer, among others) 
economic freedoms actually become structural blocks to redistribution through progressive taxation. 
Consequently, the socio-economic constitution of the Union is radically individualistic, and 
consequently, downplays the key role played by collective goods as part of fundamental rights in the 
postwar Social and Democratic Rechtsstaat. For two, the limited redistribution of resources that takes 
place within the European Union is mediated by the States. The decision to equip the Communities 
with genuine own resources, while never fully implemented, was partially reversed in 1984, and is in 
the process of being fully reversed, with the funding of the expenses of the Union increasingly coming 
from state contributions. To that it should be added that the actual redistributive expenses of the Union 
are calculated by reference to the relative position of states and regions, not of individuals. 
Consequently, the fiscal constitution of the Union has a collective, not individual, unit of distributive 
justice, contrary to what is the case in the postwar Social and Democratic Rechtsstaat. 
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Fifth thesis, political justice calls for the reconstitution of the European Union in a democratic fashion. 
We should write a democratic European constitution, we may write a democratic European 
constitution, but quite tragically we simply cannot write a democratic European constitution. 
What I would like to stress is that the Social Democratic Rechsstaat concerning subjective rights and 
fundamental collective rights underpin such rights. EU pushes national diplomacy to supranational 
law: cartels that existed before are now subject to intervention. Second, it helped overcome democratic 
deficit. Third, it created a stability background post-war. In the 1980s, there were several turning 
points. Judicially, Cassis du Dijon
26
 was a turning point as it instilled a neo-liberal ideology, Callahan 
in 1976 changing course, which is confirmed by Thatcher. Cassis and subsequently Thatcher changed 
the course of EU law because it undermines the Rechtsstaat – it acted in contradictory ways. First, 
Economic freedoms are the nemesis of the social democratic Rechtsstaat since Cassis. Second, the 
asymmetric monetary and economic union has become a constitutional Frankenstein as we are 
selectively applying Treaties. The European Central Bank should not be doing what it is doing. We 
have mutated into a form of executive constitutionalism galore, with some executives becoming more 
influential than the others. We have also started to get rid of the achievements of the welfare state. We 
don’t have the right to strike or trade unions as we did earlier in the periphery. Third problem, 
Economic freedom has resulted in dominating interests. Underlying these problems is how we view 
Justice. We have assumed substantive justice is something that can be apolitical. It is theoretically and 
empirically false that economic freedoms are supposed to belong to notions of community justice. We 
have a funny combination where we embrace Individualistic notions of freedoms, but the benefits of 
justice accrue collectively. The unit of redistributive justice should be the individual. Conclusion: new 
constitution making process should not, cannot and will happen. 
Discussion Following the Fourth Session 
 
- Andrew Williams: The problem of focussing on injustice is the problem of attribution – the 
relationship between power and responsibility. There was a prior question on whether the EU is a 
primary or a secondary agent. If this question of power is not addressed, could focussing on 
injustice become a deflection of responsibility? 
- Daniela Caruso to Sionaidh Douglas-Scott: Could injustice in the EU destroy the living organism 
and thereby eventually justice itself?  
- András Sajó: It is no longer a dialogue about progress. The question I have is why the EU is 
moving away from a common understanding of [in]justice? 
- Sionaidh Douglas-Scott: (1) I do not think we need to go on the road of complicated questions 
about agents in order to talk about injustice. (2) Modernity has been called an autoimmune disease 
which is actually destroying itself, and a similar point could be made about the EU – there is an 
element of self destruction in it. 
- Stavros Tsakyrakis to Sionaidh Douglas-Scott: Did I understand correctly, that one either comes 
up with arguments or we rely on emotions and expect wider agreement on that base?  
- Sionaidh Douglas-Scott: I think we might say that something is unjust, but disagree about the 
reasons why we believe it is unjust. There is in fact research to the role of emotions in moral 
reasoning. 
- Neil Walker: I would always be wary of a system which allows political masters to point at 
injustices beyond their influence or control instead of taking responsibility. This should not 
become a feature of the EU. 
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- Agustín J. Menéndez: Perhaps we are unavoidably talking past each other, because we come from 
different constitutional traditions wherein the relation between the (constitutional) law and the 
idea of justice differs. It is in that regard that we have underestimated the structural differences 
between (1) the Social and Democratic Rechtsstaat, which being a late child of Weimar 
underpinned the constitutional self-understanding of the French and the Italian republics (and later 
of Spain and Portugal), but which crystallised in a similar form, resulting from a different 
historical and intellectual trajectory, in postwar austerity Britain (the real austerity, I am tempted 
to say, not the present bogus one) and (2) the ordoliberal Social Market Economy, which is the 
late child of the collapse of Weimar, and has come to dominate the self-understanding of the 
German Republic, especially after the failure of Schiller’s brief Keynesian moment, and the 
ascendancy of the myth of the Bundesbank in the 1970s and 1980s. 
- András Sajó: Whether the constitutional welfare state is sustainable is the real issue. France 
encourages Chinese or Korean investment. These companies will ask for restrictions on trade 
unions. This has nothing to do with the law. At the legal level, perhaps nothing will change but 
things in practice will change. How is this structural problem to be addressed and at the same time 
how to maintain the constitutional welfare state? 
- Daniel Augenstein: I want to pick up on Antonia’s remarks about trans-national justice. The EU 
creates an attractive trans-national legal space for a particular kind of people. But there are also 
those who don’t move, and/or who are not economically active, at least not in the way required for 
them to enjoy the kind of trans-national justice the EU has on offer. 
- Oliver Gerstenberg: how does Cassis de Dijon create so many problems? It was just spurious 
alcohol! Sometimes things are national politics and policy – so how can we accuse the EU of such 
things? Many of the problems of the national welfare state are caused from within. Just consider 
contemporary British debates about the welfare state—and the attempts by some—reminiscent of 
Mitt Romney’s failed strategy—of dividing society (and the vulnerable) into strivers and benefit-
scroungers. 
- Damian Chalmers: I disagree with Agustín as a recent judgement of German Constitutional Court 
on parliamentiarisation of bond issues shows a kind of ‘no-questions asked’ nationalisation by the 
executive. There is no question about parliamentarisation, liability, operations – this has never 
happened before.  
- Dimitry Kochenov: I disagree with Damjan to a certain extent – is emptiness really a problem? 
Emptiness is not a reason we should not consider usefulness – you need to point to uselessness. 
Emptiness is a bad way to dispose of justice. 
- In relation to Agustín: In Bidar,
27
 the ECJ cracked the Member State, as there is a social reality 
which the Member State does not want to acknowledge. This is a good thing as this is – as Gareth 
calls it – the constitutional humiliation of the Member States by the European Union. This is why 
we have the right to strike in the Netherlands – it was initially not there on the books. Thus, the 
periphery may suffer from it and the centre may benefit from it – it’s not a one-way street. As 
András Sajó mentioned, we really need to preserve what we have. If we watch what’s happening 
in Hungary, Romania – there are important problems and steps taken by EU institutions are 
branded as unjust, but on procedural, not substantive grounds. On substantive grounds, I agree 
with Damjan, who made a magnificent point that preserving the status-quo is painful for the 
periphery, and we have the ability not to do so.  
- Antonia Layard: I’m yet to understand whether EU justice is different from justice in general – 
does it stop at the boundary?  
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- Damjan Kukovec: I did not say that theories of justice are devoid of meaning. The word “justice” 
is devoid of content, as Laclau stated, not theories of justice. What I said was that no theory has 
one necessary realization. What I wanted to point out is that if we say “we need more justice”, 
such statement has no content, but for the fact that we are not satisfied with the existing situation. 
But this in itself is also not the core problem of the discourse of justice. The problem is that both 
justice as a rhetorical move, i.e. “we need more justice” and the theories of justice, argued in 
universal terms, are bound to reproduce the status quo. The argument “we need more justice” and 
the theories of justice will be realized in the existing consciousness, in the consciousness of the 
interplay of existing, present, strong particular claims, which are rendered to be universal. In the 
European Union law context, as I have repeatedly argued, these are the claims of those in the 
structural situation of the center of the EU, while the claims of the periphery do not reach the 
status of universality. As such, they are foreclosed from operating powerfully in the discourse of 
universal justice. The realization of justice in the current consciousness promises to be carried out 
and entrench the existing conceptualization of harm, from the perspective of the center. 
- Agustín J. Menéndez: I remain deeply sceptical of the paradigm of competitiveness, both on 
empirical and on normative grounds. Consider these three different but related arguments. First, 
for trade to be sustainable it has to be mutually beneficial. This was understood even by David 
Ricardo, but seems not to be understood by the third generation of ordoliberals now shaping the 
economic policy of the European Union. Either the “ordo” of the international system is one 
which structurally rebalances trade, or there is the risk that imbalances will pile up and the system 
will collapse, as indeed it did during the interwar period. If some states run permanent trade 
deficits and others run permanent trade surpluses, the system can only be balanced by credit being 
extended by the countries in surplus to those in deficit. But if the trade imbalances persist, credit 
only buys time. At some point the debt reveals itself as impossible to pay back. This is why 
Keynes argued in the last years of the second world war in favour of balanced international trade, 
away from a system based on unbalanced competition (which is the real nature of the 
competitiveness paradigm). This vision failed to shape the Bretton Woods arrangement 
(something which played a part in their collapse barely thirteen years after being fully applied), 
but underpinned the European Payments Union. Second, the whole concept of competitiveness is 
vague and underdefined. Can we really have anything approaching free competition when China 
enters the fray? The socio-economic constitution of China is largely capitalist, but the state 
remains heavily in control of the way in which capital acts. Chinese combination of a strong 
Communist state and capitalism may be on the verge of proving much more effective in purely 
productive terms than the postwar alliance between the democratic state and capitalism, but that 
peculiar state configuration is one where the forces of free competition à la Hayek are simply non-
existent. Third, when free competition is regarded as being the force that should shape the very 
“ordo” of the economy, there is the risk that capitalism devours itself. Tax dodging in the 
European Union is directly related to the utopian understanding of economic freedoms defended 
by the European Court of Justice. But if it proceeds unabated, it will end up undermining the very 
institutional structures that render the market economy possible to start with. And in the process, 
undoing democracy itself. Indeed, Damian is right in calling our attention to the shifts of power 
and competences between European institutions. But perhaps this is just a secondary show, the 
main show being the shift of power between public institutions tout court and key actors in the 
financial markets. A shift which is at the very least symbolically reinforced by the rather revealing 
decision to make use of the very instruments through which financial actors evade state regulation 
and tax power to rough the boat of the European Union. The European Financial Stability Facility 
was, after all, a special purpose vehicle, legally speaking a societe anonyme luxembourgeois, 
established in Luxembourg (where the owners of hedge funds have a proclivity to establish them), 
and governed by English law. 
- Damjan Kukovec: I do not see the key component of center-periphery relationship as spatial and 
geographical, but above all, as hierarchical. The consciousness of the actors involved in the EU’s 
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internal market is very cemented. The legal discourse is an interplay of the claims of the center 
and the claims of the periphery sound unreasonable in this discourse. 
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Fifth Session: Participation, Citizenship, and Human Rights 
Daniel Augenstein: EU Justice as Politics 
Concerning prosperity, I am not concerned with the appropriateness or effectiveness of the austerity 
measures we are currently facing, but I want to ask whether this quid pro quo of money for reform is 
in the nature of the polity, and I want to suggest that what we witness is an internalization of economic 
risk and an externalization of political accountability. Very briefly: if you look at it from the 
perspective of the Member States, it is unlikely that any Member State could impose these measures 
upon its own people on its own account. So you need Brussels’ helping hand. At the same time, the 
political protest we see in these states does not register at a European level, but is channelled toward 
the national government. Now when you look to it from a European perspective somewhat shielded 
from these national political anxieties, the EU treats the economic crisis very much as something that 
is internal to the euro polity. So, something that is more akin to domestic politics than the foreign 
interventions we normally associate with the IMF and the World Bank in some other contexts. At the 
same time again there is a sense in which political accountabilities matter. To give some examples, 
think about a proposal to curtail the powers of national parliaments in favour of technocratic 
government, or the concentration of political power in a bank, which is meant to be independent from 
politics. 
Now, the broader point here is that I think what the crisis shows us is that it is less and less plausible to 
insulate the economy and economic integration, its common market and questions about its common 
good. This brings us to my second point about unity, because as I see it, it makes little sense to pose 
the question of the common good without presupposing political unity. It is a question of who holds 
this good in common. Now to conceptualize European political unity, it is necessary to detach 
ourselves from certain propositions associated with this paradigmatic case of statism represented by 
democracy. I want to do this through the lens of political representation which is something kind of 
popular where I work. The proposal is that political unity does not presuppose or is grounded in a 
substantive unity of the people, a common set of property values and nor does it require a particular 
set of democratic institutions. Rather, at a more detached level – political unity is a product of positing 
the polity to law and deriving law from the polity. Whereas the latter aspect is the one that provides its 
legitimation. Now, this doesn’t say anything about content of the common good, which brings me to 
my third point, the topic of this conference, which is justice.  
Like others I approach justice from the political justice – from the perspective of justification, but I do 
so in a slightly different way. I want to suggest that political justice engages the common good by 
asking what precisely is it that justifies the political unity of the polity. This is in a way putting it in the 
context of political ownership. What is it that is presented to us as the common good that we are asked 
to endorse as our own. This is how I engage with justification. The first obvious candidate would be 
fundamental rights, partly because whatever are your conflicting views on the relationship between 
rights and democracy, I think that most people would agree that fundamental rights do carry part of the 
burden of transforming power into legitimate forms of political authority. It is also the obvious 
candidate is the sense that fundamental rights are said to reveal something fundamental about the 
nature of the polity. I am here drawing on Joseph Weiler’s distinction between fundamental rights and 
fundamental boundaries.
28
 Fundamental rights are about the autonomy and self-determination of the 
individual, and fundamental boundaries are about the autonomy and self-determination of the polity. 
Together they epitomize the core identity of the whole. To convey their communitarian undertones I 
propose a political reading of this. Fundamental rights motivate the individual toward collective self-
restraint. You again have fundamental rights and fundamental boundaries. My important point for this 
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purpose here is that the relationship between fundamental rights and fundamental boundaries has 
always been considered as entrenched in the Member States. So the European Union does not lay 
claim to a European equivalent of a national constitutional tradition, yet could function as a 
fundamental boundary of the European polity. Rather, what we find –and I do not want to go in the 
jurisprudence now– is that instead appeal to a commonality between Member States’ national 
traditions and disappeared commonality is meant to aid diversity. Now, appeal to diversity cannot 
establish a claim to autonomy as distinctiveness, so it fails to spell out the fundamental boundary of 
the European polity. It fails to give flesh to the bones of the claim of autonomy if you wish. Instead, 
what renders EU fundamental rights autonomous is an appeal to the common market.  
I would like to address the political question: how meaningful is a political argument about having a 
market in common. Economic integration was always a means to political integration. Thus, 
presenting economic integration as apolitical, or something that is exclusively about the market, is 
problematic. So this all appeals to the unity of the market and the cohesion of the community. How 
can we have a meaningful political argument about what it entails to having a market in common? 
And there is a tension here. One the one hand, European economic integration was always a political 
project, at least in the minimal sense that economic integration was a means to the end of political 
integration. On the other hand, European political integration seems to work best if and to the extent 
that economic integration is presented as apolitical: it is only about the market. There are many 
accounts of this sort of problems, but to mention three words: technocracy, juridification, 
depoliticization. 
Many people have written about this. I just want to add one aspect I think that is particular to this 
crisis. If it was the case that economic integration was presented as a means to a however 
impoverished notion of political integration, thanks to the crisis you would have a new momentum 
here. There are no alternatives, this is how it is being presented. If this is true, and this is truly the end 
of politics, there is no more meaningful way of engaging in politics when it comes to the inevitable. 
There are no more choices to be made. Last point – fundamental rights: to bring it back to fundamental 
rights and end with a less dystopian outlook, the question that arises from the perspective of 
fundamental rights is whether fundamental rights can still muster the political strength to motivate 
eventual empowerments towards collective self-restraint of a polity whose fundamental boundary is 
the market.  
Richard Bellamy: Political Justice for an Ever Closer Union of European Peoples 
The argument I want to put forward is broadly Rawlsean in inspiration, taking off from his The Law of 
Peoples Harvard University Press, 1999, though I depart from his arguments in certain crucial respects 
which are influenced by Philip Pettit’s republican development of this approach29 (though I have my 
differences with Pettit too). Below I want to sketch an answer to three questions: why political 
justice?, why peoples?, what are the implications for the EU? 
Why political justice? 
I’m aware this is predominantly a gathering of lawyers, who may be inclined to assume that political 
justice consists of a just legal constitution to regulate the political relations of citizens, these political 
relations being broadly conceived so as to include much of their publically regulated social/private 
relations as well. To a certain degree, this appears – prima facie at least - to have been Rawls’s view, 
as expressed most fully in Political Liberalism. Yet, a distinctively political concern and context 
motivated his argument: namely, that if those political agents and agencies charged with promulgating, 
administering and enforcing the collective policies of any political society (which include the judges 
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and other officers of the legal system) are to do so legitimately, as the credible agents of all citizens 
rather than of themselves or certain influential groups, then their actions need to be publically 
justifiable to all citizens as giving equal consideration to their interests. Indeed, the definition of what 
he called a `well-ordered society’ is that it is ‘effectively regulated by some public conception of 
justice, whatever that conception of justice may be.’ (JF: 7).  
One can express this Rawlsean argument in the more political language of Pettit’s republicanism as 
follows: only those policies that track the commonly avowed interests of citizens will be non-
dominating. In other words, a conception of justice needs to be public in two senses – it must be 
openly avowable and serve shared concerns, with these two criteria seeking to rule out the capture of 
political (and legal) power by private, sectional interests.  
The need for such a public conception arises from what, again adapting Rawls (here following Hume), 
we can call the `circumstances of political justice’. These are occasioned by two issues: first, the fact 
that people have different interests and conceptions of the good; and second, the resulting need to 
resolve conflicts in a manner all can acknowledge as fair, and the difficulty of doing so given the 
tendency all human beings have to be partial to their own values and interests – be it for self-interested 
reasons or on account of our limited experience. However, Rawls himself offered a curiously 
depoliticised response to this dilemma in suggesting that citizens could abstract from their differences 
and achieve an ‘overlapping consensus’ on certain political principles to regulate their public affairs, 
with these being capable of codification within an entrenched constitution expressive of the will of 
‘we the people’ and adjudicated upon by a constitutional court. Yet this solution largely circumvents 
the very issues that occasion the need for political justice in the first place – namely, the problem of 
conflict and disagreement, on the one hand, and the difficulty of partiality and, one might add, 
fallibility, on the other. Is it really possible – except perhaps at the most abstract level, to agree on 
substantive principles of justice; and how can one expect any set of persons to reliably interpret them 
without either partiality to their own limited ways of thinking or committing mistakes? 
An alternative, genuinely political, account of justice addresses these problems in a different way. It 
sees a democratic political process as offering just such a public mechanism for the equal 
consideration of interests – offering equality of respect by giving all citizens a vote in fair and regular 
elections, and equality of concern through forcing rulers to be publically authorised by and 
accountable to the ruled. In this account, it is an impartial process that leads citizens to engage with 
each others views and concerns and that offers a mechanism for checking that those who govern do so 
on their terms, in ways that can correct for their partial and fallible actions. This argument is Rawlsean 
in spirit if not in the letter. Justice is political because we encounter the need for just rules to regulate 
our social behaviour in circumstances where we need a political process to fairly and publically 
adjudicate between our different, partial and fallible, understandings of justice. 
Why peoples? 
In TJ Rawls conceives of justice in terms of those principles that would be agreed upon by individuals 
as suitable for the regulation of the basic structure of society. However it becomes clear in PL that 
these individuals are citizens of a liberal democracy who collectively form a people. Moreover, when 
Rawls speaks of international justice, he talks of those principles that would be agreed between the 
authorised and accountable agents of well-ordered peoples rather than all individuals across the entire 
globe. 
Rawls’s reasoning is that only a people are likely to agree on principles of justice of the public kind 
that are needed to regulate a political society. A people is composed of natural persons who have 
claims against each other by virtue of being engaged in a ‘cooperative venture for mutual 
advantage … marked by conflicts as well as by an identity of interests’ (TJ: 4). The character of social 
cooperation – the fact that all citizens have a roughly equal stake in collective decisions, possess 
‘common sympathies’ and share a public discourse and sphere - provide the conditions that make it 
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possible for them to avow ‘common interests’ and indeed that oblige them to do so. These are 
normative conditions that structure how a ‘well ordered society’ might arise. Without them, it will be 
nigh impossible to share a public conception of justice. Either one will have a much more minimal 
view of justice, suitable for regulating separate groups with limited social relations with each other and 
only bound by their explicit contractual agreements with each other, or there will be the danger that 
the government, including the administration of justice, will be captured by certain sectional groups 
that will extract rent and oppress the other groups. Both these problems are characteristic of complex 
political systems characterised by multiple layers of governance and the proliferation of checks and 
balances and veto points. In seeking to stem the second problem, they create the first and vice versa. 
Ironically, the United States Constitution that inspires much of Rawls’s own attempt to deduce 
institutional recommendations from his theory is probably the best known exemplar of these dual 
failings.  
Within the international sphere, justice has to be between peoples rather than persons because the 
relationships of cooperation that generate a public conception of justice are absent in this context. 
Moreover, for those citizens who do share such a conception as part of a people, it is hard to see why 
they should seek to establish norms of justice at the international level except in that guise – that is, via 
the representatives of their peoples rather than directly themselves. Note, though, that Rawls 
deliberately does not talk of states. His reasoning is that states only have legitimacy as agents of 
peoples, and to be so they must be liberal democracies – regimes that have institutionalised the 
requisite public mechanisms for authorising political agents and holding them to account so that they 
can speak in their citizens name. 
The terms of justice between peoples are different to those that pertain among a people. Yet they can 
be fairly demanding nonetheless. They extend on the one hand to providing support for all citizens to 
form a people and offering aid to those who have not been able to, and on the other to ensuring that the 
relations between peoples are conducted on the basis of equal concern and respect: that they are non-
dominating and do not undermine the capacity of that people to conduct its affairs according to a 
public conception of justice. It also requires that those who seek to act as agents of their peoples must 
be publically authorised and accountable for what they do. They cannot claim executive authority as 
agents of a sovereign state with distinct interests to the commonly avowed interests of the citizenry. 
What are the implications for the EU? 
Arguments from justice are sometimes advanced as alternatives to arguments from democracy as a 
source for legitimising the EU, and in particular as a way of countering and even overcoming the ‘no-
demos’ argument. However, on the neo-Rawlsean account of justice offered above, that will not be 
possible. For the conditions needed for a public conception of justice are precisely those required for a 
workable democracy that can operate as a mechanism through which citizens can give equal 
consideration to their values and interests in a public way – namely, that they form a people. By 
contrast to the Habermasian notion of a constitutional patriotism, one cannot deduce the pre-conditions 
of democratic justice from adherence to the very idea of democracy. That different peoples are 
committed to democracy as a way of organising their affairs does not imply that they are committed 
to, or capable of, forming one democratic people – merely that they are committed to allowing those 
other peoples to act as democracies. 
The Rawlsean argument provides normative reasons for taking the EU’s declared goal of promoting 
‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ seriously. The Member States can all be said to be 
‘nearly just’ societies in Rawls’s sense – they operate as functioning liberal democracies for their 
respective peoples. Indeed, the main challenge to their legitimacy comes from popular pressure for the 
devolution of power downwards to their constituent peoples in the case of multinational states such as 
the UK, Spain and Belgium. Pressure for the relocation of power at a supranational level is almost 
entirely elite led – it is driven by the logic of statehood, whereby rulers claim to speak in the name of 
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their subjects by virtue of having sovereignty over them and seek to maximise state power through 
competition, conquest, merger or mutually beneficial bargains. From this Hobbesean perspective, 
rulers relate to their subjects like company executives to their shareholders, providing them a return on 
their holding through acquisition, cartels, aggressive bargaining and so on.  
To promote political justice within the EU will be to modify this state-like logic, on the one hand, 
without seeking to create a European people, on the other. Instead, it will involve obliging state 
officials to represent their peoples on the basis of each state’s public – that is democratically 
constructed – conception of justice. That will constrain and enable. To the extent that similar 
relationships of cooperation and common terms to those found at the domestic level do not operate at 
the European level, then it will constrain by making the norms of justice operating between the 
Member States justifiably different to those operating within them. The EU currently is characterised 
more by segmental than by cross-cutting cleavages, with these segmental divisions strongly correlated 
with Member States’ borders. Within multinational states such divisions persist even after hundreds of 
years of enforced Union. There is little reason for assuming they will wither away in the EU. The 
reality of a Europe of peoples has to be grasped. However, the Rawlsean perspective on this union of 
peoples will also enable. For while the authorised rulers of a people should act rationally to further 
their interests, they ought also to be reasonable in seeking fair terms of cooperation with other peoples 
that recognise their equal right to live according to their public conception of justice. Such attitudes 
will lead to norms of mutual recognition and non-discrimination in their mutual undertakings, and 
cooperation to secure shared public goods in areas such as the environment, through measures that 
seek to overcome negative externalities and provide the full benefit of positive externalities. The EU 
has been most successful in areas that conform to these norms, and least successful where it 
overstretches them and promotes measures that are more akin to domestic than international justice.  
The rather sober conclusion stemming from these reflections is that the Euro crisis and its likely 
resolution through political union among at least some Member States is the product of such 
overstretching and will result in a polity that will prove far less capable of sustaining political justice 
than any of the Member States. 
Jiří Přibáň: Contingency of Political Justice and Participation 
I am afraid I have even worse news than Richard, because what I want to propose is simply describing 
political justice as a contingency for law and move from this language of substantive justice – of 
democracy or representation, human rights foundations as foundational moments of commonality – to 
a different language of systems theory and systemic operations at a European level. In another word, it 
is almost like moving from Ode to Joy to Kraftwerk and Autobahn and Trans-Europa Express, 
networks and communications rather than Great Values. Because, after all, when we talk about 
universal validity of values such as democracy and representation, and human rights, we can endlessly 
debate ‘what are these rights?’ These values have always a diabolical nature; you can always look at 
them as contestations, and different sets of arguments and different kinds of value. One example: 
should we support Catalans and Scots in their attempt to secede from those ‘backward monarchies’ 
and constitute finally ‘progressive republican’ regimes, or should we just support the current setting 
and its politics of constitutional patriotism. Another example: what is human rights at European level 
or at national level? Its recent examples on the ban of halal and kosher food in Netherlands, or 
circumcision in Germany. Are we in the final stage of human progress when we protect individual 
autonomy to such an extent that we ban ‘backward’ religious practices? Or is it just a continuation of 
Nazi mentality and policy by other means, this time disguised by the rhetoric of human rights? I am 
leaving it as a question, not as an answer.  
We have two possibilities. Either to look for substantive justice and – this is what we like as 
academics, because it tells us about moral community, moral values and then we believe that if we 
have a euro crisis or any kind of crisis we can steer it by providing the right formulae, by providing the 
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right moral solutions. Or maybe we could retreat and believe – like lawyers and positivists hundred 
years ago and say with Hans Kelsen that justice is not an external or ultimate criterion of legal 
validity, the ultimate source of law, but an intrinsic value of the legal system manifested in its 
procedures, operations, internal coherence and most importantly efficiency as its internal criterion of 
legitimacy. I think this is what I understood when Neil was speaking about the difference between 
justice and justification. For me, it was like a mark moving from a substantive to a procedural concept 
or proceduralized notion of justice even as a moral formula. However, because we know, there will 
always be different concepts of justice, as we heard yesterday, and we know that this concept of 
justice as a contingency formula within the law transforms a tautology into a sequence of arguments 
and makes something that is seen as highly artificial and contingent hence natural and necessary from 
the inside. I am talking already about the inside of the EU legal or political system.  
In the beginning of our seminar there was one important question raised: what is the relationship 
between legitimacy and justice? I would argue that only legitimate politics can facilitate justice. Only 
legitimate politics – and I am not engaging in the debate whether democracy, human rights based or 
what else; yes, legitimacy facilitates justice. But only functional politics can be legitimate politics, and 
therefore justice is part of this functionality, and therefore it has to be part of formal procedural justice. 
When we look – and I will go very quickly through the texts – we can see that the whole post-
Maastricht process of European integration is basically illustrated by growing pressures regarding the 
Union’s legitimacy and administration. The Lisbon Treaty has it in its Preamble, in its Article 10. 
Simply, what is legitimacy? Enhancing democracy and efficiency. The current problem of the EU in 
crisis is not just the democratic deficit, but all of its legitimacy deficits, including its deficit of 
common benefit and legitimacy by output. Europeanization always was presented as a solution to 
political and legal problems and now it is not – Europe became a source of problems, not solutions.  
If we stand back from European domain you can see politics as a permanent process of politicization 
and depoliticization. Maybe more democracy does not mean automatically more legitimacy, because 
politics is always framed by three questions: By whom am I governed? That is democracy and 
representation. But also, how much am I governed, and how well am I governed? Even European 
politics has to answer these three questions. This includes a typical functional split between 
government and governance and the EU needs to address these questions in its own terms. In other 
words, how far can you go in democratization of EU governance, and how far do we have to go in 
responding to the crisis by expertise and expert knowledge? Especially at a time when we know that 
the formula ‘Only an expert can deal with the problem’ was one of the biggest lies of the last twenty or 
thirty years in the economy, but also in politics. We remember Bill Clinton’s winning formula ‘It’s the 
economy, stupid’ from the 1990s. Today we could respond: ‘It’s politics, stupid’.  
We have to move back to political questions, including the question of commonality. So, what is our 
commonality? Can we facilitate if through a symbolic expressive rationality? When I studied these 
constitution-making moments at national level and European level in the past I was intrigued by the 
fact that legality can facilitate not just its functional, intrinsic rationality but also its symbolic 
rationality. However, I came to the conclusion that this moral rationality does not constitute an 
autopoietic self-referential system. It is systemic, but nevertheless it is much less important for 
functionality than law and politics defined by legality and power as its medium. To conclude, the 
problem of Europe’s political justice deficit is a political and not a legal one. Yes, we need more 
politics, but whether it is democratic or expert driven is an open question, and always will remain an 
open question. Dealing with this deficit, the EU and its politicians, nevertheless, need to engage in 
democratized political processes rather than yet another process of juridification of EU politics, 
because juridification is depoliticization and we need more politicization of the EU today. I think that 
continuation of the expert knowledge and administrative reason driven EU policy of the ‘there is no 
alternative’ formula would be disastrous for future of the EU in particular and Europe in general. 
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Justine Lacroix: Is a Transnational Citizenship Still Enough? 
At this stage I’m afraid I only have doubts, which I wish to discuss. These doubts concern the very 
concept of transnational citizenship, which many scholars have defended for a long time – the concept 
of an “ever-closer union” of the peoples as evoked by Richard. My key question is this: is 
transnational citizenship still enough? To be sure, the concept of Transnational Citizenship was 
conceived as a normative one, but as Jürgen Neyer pointed out, we must keep such normative concepts 
in touch with reality. More precisely, I am afraid that the current crisis undermines the three pillars of 
transnational citizenship.  
Let us consider the first pillar – the primacy of individual rights and the extension of choice beyond 
national boundaries. Current developments seem to give comfort to those who argued as long as 20 
years ago that individual rights would in the long run undermine social justice. This danger was 
pointed out from a philosophical point of view by Stavros and Floris’ argument of free movement and 
non-discrimination, and also by Agustin when he raised the question about fundamental rights. 
Let us consider the second and third pillars – mutual recognition and Europeanisation of national 
spheres. As you know, many scholars have suggested reading European citizenship as a process of 
mutual recognition. The antidote to the dispossession which citizens may feel towards European issues 
should be articulated by a Europeanisation of national spheres. Is the economic crisis a prelude to this 
Europeanisation of national spheres? Some hope so, as the recent crises in Italy, Spain and Greece 
have been treated in other countries as national issues. Europe was a key issue in the French and Dutch 
elections. In Belgium, there will be elections in the near future, and it has become almost impossible to 
speak of anything other than Europe. But is this enough – as Habermas hopes – to lead to the feeling 
of a shared destiny? At this stage, it is hard to deny that the Europeanisation of national spheres 
increases mutual prejudices more than mutual recognition. In addition, we have not so far seen any 
“spill-over effect” of attitudes from the ‘European’ to the ‘non-European Other’. In this regard, I 
regret that none of the presentations have discussed what we owe to those who try to get into the 
European Union. 
I have no solution to offer but I am no longer sure that a transnational citizenship is enough to attain 
both political and social justice in the EU. To focus the question further, we can ask (as raised by 
Philippe Van Parijs) whether the present Europe is balancing between two impossibilities. The first is 
the economic impossibility of doing anything serious about inequality at the national level, and the 
second the political impossibility of doing something serious about inequality at a supra-national level. 
This is the reason why Philippe Van Parijs argues in favor of a quasi-American distribution at a 
European level and a common language that would enable effective communication, co-ordination and 
mobilisation among Europeans. Such solutions might seem less attractive from a purely conceptual 
point of view than insisting on the radical novelty of the EU. However, they may be the only way to 
rescue political and social justice in Europe. At the end of his paper, Richard underlines that the 
resolution of the current crisis may well result in a situation in which political and social justice are 
more difficult to sustain than in our Member States. I share his worry, but it would be more precise to 
say that it may result in a situation in which justice is more difficult than it used to be in our Member 
States. 
Robert Schütze: A European ‘Incorporation Doctrine’: Human Rights and the Member States 
We have already looked at two kinds of citizenships and two kinds of corresponding rights in a federal 
polity. What I have done in this paper is to explore their relationship in the context of the United States 
and the European Union. Quickly, on the American side: American constitutionalism did not initially 
think that the federal “Bill of Rights” was incorporated into the State legal orders. There existed a dual 
structure or spheres of rights and thus two – separate – spheres of justice. Federal rights could only be 
invoked against the federal government; and – despite being an “American” citizen – they could not be 
pleaded against one’s own State government. This partly changed with the 14th Amendment after the 
Debating Europe’s Justice Deficit: The EU, Swabian Housewives, Rawls, and Ryanair 
45 
Civil War; yet, as is well known, the Supreme Court originally chose a conservative reading of the 
Amendment: only certain types of federal rights would bind the states and thus provide a common 
sphere of justice to all American citizens. Incorporation was here “selective”: not all fundamental 
rights protected at the federal level would be recognised at the state level. In the last century, the 
Supreme Court has however increasingly moved away from selective incorporation, and today almost 
all federal rights may also be enforced as against the States.  
The European story is – sadly – much more complicated, since it centres around the three bills of 
rights identified by Article 6 TEU. For each of these three sources of fundamental rights a distinct 
European incorporation doctrine has developed in the past. For European fundamental rights as 
general principles of Union law, two situations have thereby been identified as leading to 
incorporation: the implementation situation and the derogation situation. The more problematic one 
here is doubtlessly the latter. For what is a derogation from Union law; and what is the constitutional 
rationale for insisting on a common sphere of justice here? The second source of European 
fundamental rights is the Charter, and it seems that Article 51 of the Charter restricts the incorporation 
of these European fundamental rights to the implementation situation. We also have a third – future – 
direct source of fundamental rights: the ECHR. The question here is: once the Union accedes to the 
ECHR, would this not lead to a total incorporation of these fundamental rights per Article 216 (2) 
TFEU?  
In sum: there may be different conceptions of justice at the federal and state level. Yet in both the 
United States and the European Union, there has been a gradual blurring of the federal/state distinction 
which contrasts with the original idea to create separate spheres of justice. One – interesting – major 
distinction between the United States and the European Union today is that while incorporation in the 
US depends on the type of fundamental right at issue, in the EU it is the type of situation in which a 
Member State acts that determines incorporation. The latter solution may lead to much more legal 
uncertainty. This constitutional problem has, some time ago, been addressed by Advocate General 
Sharpston. In Ruiz Zambrano,
30
 she appears to propose a form of total incorporation for all European 
fundamental rights.
31
  
Discussion following the Fifth Session 
 
- Neil Walker: I wish to focus on Richard as he takes a particular position, which can clarify other 
debates by allowing us to appreciate the Rawlsian line on peoplehood. It’s a strong and resilient 
Rawlsian terminology about peoplehood, which a lot of people find very difficult. When Rawls 
talks about people who come together as a co-operative venture for mutual advantage, this co-
operation has different dimensions. This co-operative advantage which is vital to the DNA of 
peoplehood seems to have three different dimensions. One is equality of units in collective 
decisions, the second is the common effect and the third is the shared public sphere. Two points: 
these are the features, which go together for an ideal type of justice , the other meta-claim is that 
these things can only be cultivated and can only survive together. They cannot be disaggregated. 
But is that true? But can you not actually disaggregate some forms of co-operation? Some people 
say no – each of these together constitute the objective and phenomenological conditions of co-
operation as a people, as against other forms of co-operation. But the papers presented show they 
don’t have to come together in a holistic manner; you can treat ‘people coming together’ in 
different ways at different levels. This is different from a rigid grammar on geopolitics which says 
none of the conditions of justice within a state can be replicated.  
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- Agustín J. Menéndez: Can we really say that the steering of the crisis has reinforced the idea of a 
European common good? Hardly so. In fact, what we can observe, if we pay close attention to the 
form and substance of the legal measures that have been taken, is rather the opposite. After 
intentionally omitting the creation of the institutional structures allowing the putting in common of 
the risks resulting from the Europeanisation of financial institutions in 1992 and in 1997, 
Europeans were faced with the imminent collapse of banks all across Europe. Doped by EMU and 
cheap money in the American repo markets, European banks were leveraged in excess of 40 to 1. 
What was done? After a miserable attempt at improvised coordination (Dexia, Fortis), each state 
did what it could (even what it could not, as was the case with Ireland), and only afterwards the 
European Commission pretended there was a common European response. It was a matter of 
relabeling the aggregate of national decisions as a common European position. 
Can we really say that European law has become reinforced? Hardly so. Consider three 
developments. Firstly, we have a flight into the Union method, which is a peculiar attempt at 
circumventing European and national constitutional law by means of international law. The 
pious limits set by the German Constitutional Court and the ECJ (Pringle), claiming that this is 
justified as long as national and European constitutional law are respected, will become in the 
future fundamental examples of void formalistic decisions. Part of this flight is the extremely 
odd transformation of the IMF in part of the institutional framework of the European Union, 
even if partially an external institution to the Union. Secondly, not learning from the disastrous 
experience of codifying into the Treaties principles that were impossible to comply with (the no 
bailout clause), the European legislator has written into European law a set of fancy “rules” 
which are supposed to define the way in which European economies perform. Living aside the 
very interesting question of whether these “rules” are actually legal rules or travesties of legal 
rules (positive morality with hard coercion, as indeed the legally indeterminate concept of 
“structural deficit” may suggest), a fetishistic understanding of rules, based on a belief on their 
magic powers, is no indicator of the triumph of law in the steering of the crisis. Thirdly, we have 
been subjected to an overdose of pious intentions regarding the need of completing monetary 
union, most of the time by reference to political union. But what kind of completion is this? The 
actual plans being put forward are plans for having a political union without democratic politics. 
An authoritarian political union where self-interested charity is mistaken with democratic 
solidarity.  
Eurozone? We have normative intuitions, but I have problems with the empirics of it as Justine 
suggested. It is nice- there are good things about the EU, but is it stable to have a European 
Union? I agree there was a Frankenstein which was born out of global political changes, but 
what is the alternative- a Federal political union? Can we have a political union without politics? 
It would be nice if a stable European Union could repair things, but is this a form of retroactive 
charity? 
- Daniel Augenstein: Political justice only makes sense in relation to a political collective and for 
Habermas, Rawls and others this requires some notion of a constitutional legal order. This is the 
difference between the ‘constitutional’ Rawls in Political Liberalism the ‘international’ Rawls in 
The Law of Peoples. What Richard did is to apply the ‘international’ Rawls to the EU context, but 
you get a very different picture if you think that there is more to the EU than an international 
organisation of states. It all depends on how you draw the boundaries of the political collective at 
stake. For the EU, this entails asking what it means politically to have a market in common. 
Damian suggested some kind of a functional delimitation of policy areas in which the EU can 
raise legitimate justice claims. What I was trying to get at in my presentation is that this becomes 
increasingly difficult. It becomes ever harder to avoid questions relating to the common good of 
the European polity.  
If the foundation of this polity is a market, this would require a politicisation of the market. 
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- Jiří Přibáň: ‘Federalisation without politics’ – we still look for normative bases to the crisis. But 
what is this crisis? It is simply a momentary heightened contingency – perhaps some countries will 
drop, or there will be two eurozones. But political evolution will continue despite normative 
prescriptions surrounding the crisis. The tragedy of the euro was that it was legitimised by this 
notion of the common good: if you want to avoid war, let us have a common currency. The market 
does operate in a combative manner which leads to fragmentation. The European project will go 
on regardless of its normative foundation – we do not suffer from a deficit of formal justice. The 
question is how citizens and institutions will view justice from a federal context – it is still 
undecided. Foundations cannot be decided once and for all. Different fears are faced by different 
member states: political justice cannot be anything other than clarification of human rights etc. We 
cannot go on by any means other than federal democratisation- there is no other way to politicise.  
- Justine Lacroix to Agustín J. Menéndez: What is important is the issue of stability of the Union, 
which goes back to the viability of a demoï-cracy. It’s ok from a conceptual point of view, but it 
may not survive. 
- Gareth Davies: what kind of demos, shared identity, communication, values – what social context 
do you need for transnational justice? The question is not whether such context is there, as such a 
vision is very static, it creates circumstances which justify their own actions. If you do justice, 
then this may convince people that justice is possible! The ECJ has done that successfully to a 
certain extent such as Cassis by creating a conception of a shared legal order – but such contexts 
have not really been created. Psychological research shows even highly educated people, if they 
are allocated arbitrarily to a group, convince themselves that they share a bond with others in that 
group(and that others are shallow and worthless) even when they did not do so prior to such 
experiments, but that has not worked in Europe.  
- Joanne Scott: I find this comparison of EU and US interesting. But fundamental rights come in the 
EU in a collateral way because of the preliminary reference system as against the US. 
Schmidberger
32
 – freedom of speech comes up in a secondary/collateral way because of the 
preliminary reference system, where the national court has to do the preliminary work. There is 
something absent and unsatisfactory in the absence of direct action. What these cases show is that 
there is no direct action, because of the nature of the EU as a polity: EU jurisdiction is limited. Is 
the ECJ ever going to develop its human rights jurisdiction as the US Supreme Court? If it can’t, 
then will there always be a form of dissatisfaction in the way justice is done through fundamental 
rights in the EU? 
- Gráinne de Búrca: I have been reflecting on the evolution of our discussion since yesterday. 
Today what I am hearing is the impossibility of status quo justice in the EU –that there may , for 
example, be a need for a more federal political system if the EU is to embody any kind of system 
of justice. Or, alternatively, if the EU as it currently is cannot deliver justice as we currently 
understand it, that we need to consider whether there is a sui generis novel alternative, a 
conception of justice in the context of this system that is neither mere international co-operation 
nor analogous to a state level. And if so, how?  
- Carole Lyons: When did the European Union move from being a forum for market regulation to 
being an arena with justice potential? The Butter case
33
 – and the EU incorporation of German 
principles of human dignity. Free butter availability was generated by ostensibly neutral, trade 
related EEC/European Union internal market provisions but you had to use your id card to get the 
butter, thus engaging, and bringing directly to the market focused EU, issues of dignity, rights and 
justice based questions. 
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- Danny Nicol: With regard to the question as to whether deep rights without incorporation 
(Richard) can be reconciled with Strasbourg, I would caution that it isn’t that one court is federal 
as against the other one. It’s more nuanced and a difference of degree. One can discern from the 
case law of Strasbourg, for example, the emphasis on the right of effective remedy as national 
judges can be held responsible for not doing so. Second, the opening up of remedies shows this. 
Obviously ECJ is more federal which is why there is no prisoner voting in the UK. 
- Daniel Augenstein: If you are Dworkinian, the European Court of Justice and the European Court 
of Human Rights should spell out the single right answer to conflicts of rights across the 
Union/Convention legal space, no deference, margin of appreciation and the like. From this 
perspective of rights jurisprudence, the EU would very much operate like a constitutional state.  
- Damjan Kukovec: What is it exactly that we are pursuing when we argue for “more justice”? You 
said we need more politics? I could possibly agree with that but it seems to me that the assumption 
is that as soon as we have more politics, more “justice” will follow. The key question to me is 
what kind of politics and what kind of justice we want, this is the eternal question. Also, when we 
say that we need less law and more politics, we need to be aware of the fact that politicians are 
bound by the constraints of the legal language just as well. Indeed, you said later that more politics 
should mean more human rights and more democracy. But a call for politics in this sense 
reproduces the same unresolved questions – what kind of democracy and what kind of human 
rights do we desire? Yes, we need a human rights regime, but you can construct alternative human 
rights regimes, so where does such an abstract debate lead us? Furthermore, if more justice equals 
more human rights, why do we need to speak about justice at all? We could only say that we need 
more human rights. Moreover, we speak about “more justice” and “less justice”. But how is this 
really different from our own personal preferences or values? And how do you deal with “justice” 
in a particular case? Let’s imagine we get a merger case on the table, or the Schmidberger case 
that was just mentioned. How would the talk of justice, as we hear it deployed, help us? What do 
we do with justice, how do we operationalize it? We critique the European Court of Justice, but 
what exactly would the European Court of Justice have to do, what do we actually want when we 
argue for "more justice"? 
- Dimitry Kochenov: Introducing dynamics following Gareth’s demos-taken-as-a-given: one factor 
is shaking the boat through contesting the settled agreements at the national level. However united 
the demos, there are outcasts and there are now outcasts before the ECJ. The ECJ can help them to 
forward their own version of justice, which allows us to rethink basic values which are taken as a 
given at the national level. The EU helps us to reinvent the Member States and creates a different 
vantage point, as it were, and it is important to ensure access to people who want to contest 
notions of justice at different levels. So we need an outline what rights apply where. So what 
Robert said is fundamental and parallels with the US are vital: when Eleanor Sharpston went in 
Ruiz Zambrano for the programma maksimum using Leninist language – a totally new Union has 
been proposed. I don’t entirely agree that the Court is moving from an assessment of rights 
towards a right assessment. If we look at the latest cases on citizenship rights, the court applies 
rights, which it invents – which are not grounded in the Charter, Treaty, anywhere – probably 
unwritten rights which are not connected to the specific cross-border situation, which was the 
doctrinal approach before. So it is shaking the boat and being optimistic about it. 
- Justine Lacroix: there might be a misunderstanding, as I agree that there is no such thing as 
transnational citizenship since one needs to be a Member State national to be a European Citizen. 
However, many scholars consider that the principles of free movement and the absence of any 
discrimination grounded on nationality are the actualisation of the cosmopolitan law envisioned by 
Kant.  
- Oliver Gerstenberg: The activism of the Courts – not Leninist (not even in Maurice Duverger’s 
sense) but Marxian – the consciousness limps behind reality. The constructive function of the 
Courts may, in a way, be ahead of social reality. If a legal construction is new, and the alternative 
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is worse, then, without it, an idea of Europe would be lost. Take the ECtHR’s decision in Goodwin 
concerning the plight of transsexuals. The Court said there’s an “international trend” towards legal 
recognition. But how do we know there’s a trend unless we were already looking for it? So moral 
judgment is necessary—and irreducible. And it makes good democratic sense. Of course, the 
judges didn’t just make it up—they were responsive to changing social values in society. The 
decision epitomizes the complex entanglement of fact and value which is inescapable whenever 
judges set out to develop the law. 
- Agustín J. Menéndez: Social rights have taken the very back seat in the European Union since the 
beginning of the crisis. With an eye to the empirical reality of the “PIIGS” countries, it is hard to 
affirm that fundamental labour rights, as the right to form a trade union and the right to strike, are 
actually enjoyed by most workers. Similarly, the thinning of the welfare states resulting from 
“austerity” as endorsed by European institutions following the intellectual lead of Alberto 
Alessina and others, casts a long shadow on the effectiveness of the right to health and the right to 
education. Austerity kills rights, and has already killed many persons who were turned into despair 
and committed suicide. Or who have been deprived of medical treatment that has made their 
condition a lethal one. And the worse – in terms of the structural damage to the populations of the 
PIIGS, and to the very integrity of their social and political structures – is still to come. 
- Jürgen Neyer: I’m not very qualified to talk about social rights. I’m not saying that the ECJ does 
not have the mandate to protect fundamental rights, but it appears to be more minimalist. With 
regard to Richard, federalism is unity in diversity – we are not treating everyone as equal – but 
perhaps you didn’t talk about inequality in a spatial sense, but in a sense of rich versus poor. 
Perhaps once you have political safeguards, then minority rights can be protected. With regard to 
Dimitry, other than Lenin, sometimes you have to shake the boat to be established. I guess that 
one of the expressions of that is constitutional pluralism which I’m not too happy with, as it does 
not lead to any solution – just says that there is something wrong with the existing system. To the 
observation regarding a shift in the court’s jurisprudence, I have to go back to see if there is indeed 
a shift in the way rights have been incorporated. 
- András Sajó: There are people who believe that the European Court of Human Rights should have 
a Dworkinian approach, but one must accept that there are reasonable disagreements in a 
pluralistic society. The Court does have a pro-European mandate, though this is contested and it is 
under growing pressure. It is important to reflect on the real role of transnational courts as they are 
not working in isolation. If you look at the interaction of Strasbourg with domestic judicial 
systems, there are enormous differences in that interaction. These differences may be limited to 
the judicial sphere). The Swedish Supreme Court tries to figure out what would have been a 
judgement of Strasbourg in a parallel case, and when the case comes to us, they learn that they are 
wrong. In Belgium and Holland, they order a stay of proceedings if a comparable case is going on. 
The UK judiciary is ready to transpose it immediately. With Germany it is a bit different, and 
some countries couldn’t care less. They pay the awards and do nothing. Lithuania, 
notwithstanding its respectable compliance, never changes its law on transgendered people but the 
domestic courts offer damages to people who go to Thailand, get operations done there and come 
back to claim damages. Obviously, human rights cannot alone generate social justice. We may 
even be overestimating the role of human rights in Europe. A grim part of reality is that there is no 
responsiveness to systemic human rights problems. Europe is a little bit less critical than it should 
be; for this absence of soul-searching we certainly need to look within the nation-states. 
- Jiří Přibáň: I am almost ashamed that my presentation was taken as provocation. I wanted to come 
with the most humble presentation on systems theory without mentioning reflexivity and 
autopoesis. The idea of reflexivity is simply democratisation of democracy. Something which is a 
non-foundationalist, yet founding principle of the EU, but it nonetheless has to be nationalised by 
Member States, too. The German Federal Constitutional Court in a recent judgement was 
devolving democracy by requiring the German parliament to deal with democratic deficits of EU 
decision-making. We can no longer disguise the political project by further economisation or 
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juridification of European integration. I have a problem with Derrida post-1990 as this is turning 
deconstruction into moral kitsch. The distinction between procedural and formal justice is 
undoubtedly a construct of legal theory, but it helps us to operationalise justice within formal law 
and legal system. From the perspective of formal justice, European justice particularly gets 
reformulated and framed by the debate about constitutional courts making national parliaments 
responsible for the democratic legitimacy of further formal processes of European integration. 
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Sixth Session: Inter-Generational Considerations: Historical and Ecological 
András Sajó: Vulnerability and Victimhood as Grounds for Reparative Justice Distributive in 
Nature 
‘Europe’ is understood for the purpose of this paper beyond merely the EU 27 and its institutions. I 
understand that EU institutions do pose a very specific problem in the process of generating justice in 
terms of legitimacy but the perspective here is broader. I am interested in how concepts of justice are 
generated or sustained. The discussion so far related to a modern or post-modern understanding of 
justice. But I think Europe is not necessarily fully modern, and concepts of ‘justice’ which pre-date 
modernity still exist. It is a fact of contemporary life, that there are alternative ways of generating 
justice, not all connected to modernity.  
When talking about generating justice, I refer to a theory of moral sentiments which I think is 
empirically valid and relevant to concepts of justice. Then there is a normative question, to what extent 
different groups have to accept a given concept of justice, and what are the grounds for accepting it. 
An additional issue is the special task for legislation and a different task for courts in coping with 
emerging concepts of justice. 
Today I concentrate on a specific form of generating justice, or better said claims of justice. What we 
are really talking about: claims of justice, not justice as such. This is based on victimhood and 
vulnerability. Now, victimhood is very specific in this context because it is assumed that the human 
rights system, especially in Europe is based on the experiences of World War II, where in fact, 
fundamental victimization occurred. There is a general shared belief that this should not be repeated. 
This seems to offer a very accommodating human rights environment. Here specific forms of 
victimhood are based on genocidal victimization. But if you look at the history of this recognition, 
genocidal victimization was not something taken for granted or foundational right after Word War 2. 
The recognition of specific victimhood was selective, and its acceptance took a long conflict of over 
20 years. On the basis of this recognition of victimhood, there was a certain trend to apply the same 
approach for other claims; vulnerable groups have gradually accepted to represent their claims in 
terms of being victims. And sometimes, this was a clear and easy to understand association. If you 
look at the anti-Roma prejudice, and genocidal persecution, there are long-lasting consequences, 
making them socially vulnerable. So, here victimhood and vulnerability are historically interlinked. 
But there are many other groups which partly accepted victimhood as a strategy and centered on their 
vulnerability as a source of rights. Vulnerability as a result of socio-economic disadvantage is 
construed; Nancy Fraser called it ‘misrecognition’.34 Institutionalized patterns of culture or value 
constitute some actors as inferior and excluded, so the need for protection of the dignity of the 
vulnerable group and the members of the vulnerable group builds as a justification for social services 
that are otherwise not necessarily due. 
I will end by saying that justice politics based on vulnerability has normative advantages but it 
is very difficult to use it as a foundation for policy. When it comes to judicial policy, as a form of 
adjudication, taking vulnerability into consideration becomes much more important, or at least easier 
to deal with, because in this case it serves as a tool for making judges sensitive to issues which are 
otherwise hidden by traditional legal dogmatics. At this point, a traditional role for courts may emerge. 
Just as the King was the protector of the weak, the Courts will become the protector of the weak. This 
offers them a traditional legitimacy which easily resonates in the general public. This protective role 
has a perfect legitimacy in democratic theory. The role of the court is to intervene in the name of rights 
when there are insular minorities. The courts have a very adequate function here, and I feel 
comfortable with that. To what extent is this idea accepted in trans-national, super-national courts? 
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This remains to be debated. But there is a strong claim of legitimacy, even within democratic theory 
for that kind of role. 
Carole Lyons: Just Fatherlands? From Kristallnacht to Katyn 
Though drafted in the shadow of the Shoah, there is really no formal recognition of institutionalized 
killing embedded in the European Convention of Human Rights. I classify this as the ‘original sin’ of 
the Convention, a sin which permeates through the decades. My concern today is with the European 
Court in Strasbourg, but indeed similar questions may be asked of the EU Court in Luxembourg. My 
question is: how do these courts work through their specific, extreme past? How does a day to day EU 
lawyer move from dealing with prosaic free movement of goods to confronting the legacy of the 
Shoah? I think we must remember that EU justice issues considered today did not all begin with the 
market, with coal and steel, with Schuman - they did not begin there but prior. Three themes will be 
focused on: (1) historical justice and the role of the courts, (2) memory mediated through the judicial 
route, and (3) the specific legacy of Auschwitz in Europe and the human rights response. Firstly, 
courts and historical justice; there are fascinating layers of adjudication observable in Europe in the 
1960’s, when, for example direct effect was being conceived in the Van Gend case35, while at the very 
same time German judges were dealing with the mass killings in Treblinka. How did the emergent 
Europe embrace those very distinct strata of justice and was there any integration or link between 
them? The second theme is courts as sites of memory. The ECtHR is an enthralling arena for European 
legal historians, although a relatively unexplored one. When you ask the question about a court as site 
of memory, the work of Pierre Nora has influenced me here, and effectively if you adopt his approach, 
courts can’t deal with memory, they can deal with history but not actually with genuine memory 
because of its intimate organic nature.
36
 And finally, the issue of the legacy of the Holocaust in 
Europe. In the 1961 X v Germany case,
37
 the nameless X was in Auschwitz and several other camps 
and epitomizes the whole gamut of the Jewish experience of World War II and the Holocaust, from 
Kristallnacht onwards. His case was guillotined and rendered inadmissible; the paper examines how 
that compares to how cases involving National Socialists were dealt with in the same era in 
Strasbourg. To add by way of quick conclusion and connections with other contributions, I liked 
Neil’s comment about how one conception of justice is the capacity to deal with arbitrary domination 
and see links with themes of this paper and also Damian’s view of justice as mutual dependency, in 
relation to which I argue from context of my paper that if you haven’t got mutual confrontation of the 
past, then that ability to have mutual dependency is depleted. 
Joanne Scott: The Justice Dimension of the EU’s Climate Change Unilateralism 
The background to the paper that I want to give is very well known – the lack of progress in global 
climate change talks and this lack of progress is in significant measure because countries can’t agree 
as to how the burden of mitigation is to be distributed between states, and how the principle of 
Common But Differentiated Responsibility established in international law should be interpreted and 
applied. Absent any agreement as to that distribution question, really barely any progress is being 
made. Against that background the EU is persevering, it has established a unilateral emissions 
reduction target for 2020; there are serious questions about whether the tools are appropriate, but it is 
pushing forward. But it is inevitable given the competitiveness issue being raised elsewhere that the 
EU is struggling to do this alone. There’s a limit to what it can achieve alone – it contributes 10% to 
global emissions, can cut a whole lot but won’t make a whole lot of difference. Within the EU 
distributive questions are also being raised. Poland, in particular, is blocking any efforts at 
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constructive reform. Competitiveness concerns are being raised by countries such as the UK. Against 
that background, the EU is attempting something that is quite interesting, ambitious and controversial 
as it extends the global reach of its climate law by trying to bring in within the European climate 
change regime foreign actors based abroad. We see this most closely in the extremely flawed 
emissions trading scheme. The clearest example is the EU decision to bring in foreign airlines within 
the European emissions trading regime. Thus any flight departing or arriving in the EU will have to 
purchase allowances from the EU to cover the entire flight – all the way from San Diego to London 
and just not the stretch within the EU territorial space. So the EU is seeking to extend the global reach 
of its climate change law to assuage competitiveness concerns and also in a bid to serve as a catalyst 
for climate action elsewhere, on the part of other states and on the part of the global community. The 
EU framework for externalising its climate change law is very firmly premised upon the concept of 
equal treatment – so it’s based upon the equal treatment of airlines regardless of the nationality of the 
airline and the route that the airline flies. The EU regime based upon equal treatment in the sense that 
third countries can be exempted if they adopt measures which are equivalent to the measures which 
have been adopted by the EU. So it’s equal treatment all the way through. The principle of CBDR – 
the idea that different countries should bear different burdens depending on how much they 
contributed to the problem and how much capacity they have to respond to the problem – is in no way 
reflected in the regime. There are different ways to respond to that. One response is to say that this is 
completely right. The idea behind the EU regime is to serve as a catalyst for global climate response – 
since such a regime is so unbelievably unfair and the regulatory penalty default so unattractive - other 
countries will have a genuine incentive to negotiate a better deal. Another possible response which has 
been a familiar response from American readers is to say that the principle of CBDR is wholly 
misconceived in this context. It only concerned with distribution between states and not between 
individuals – we should be concerned with achieving climate justice, which means protecting the 
vulnerable and the poor from the impact of climate change policies. So actually the aviation point is a 
wonderful illustration of how the current thinking on climate change justice as CBDR is misconceived 
because it is only the rich who fly. Finally, one could argue that actually the principle of CBDR should 
be considered to be relevant in the context of EU unilateral action – the EU acting alone captures 60% 
of global aviation emissions (Robert’s scale point). In that context, to argue against the relevance of 
CBDR seems to be misconceived. In keeping with this, my co-author (Lavanya Rajamani) and I give 
practical examples as to the how the principle of CBDR may be appropriately reflected in the context 
of climate change unilateralism. 
Jane Holder: Negotiating Nature and Ecological Justice in the EU 
For the last few years I’ve worked on environmental justice, spatial justice, climate justice and 
ecological justice. It struck me that such categories or dimensions of justice have no home as yet 
within the EU: there is limited visibility or reception of such categories of justice within the EU. There 
have been useful attempts to apply quite creatively EU law on racial discrimination to deal with cases 
of environmental injustices in which the location of developments disproportionately affects particular 
racial or socio-economic groups within society, but this remains limited in practice. I wanted to use 
this forum to work through the potential place and destabilising role of ideas of ecological justice 
using in particular the Habitats Directive, and Natura 2000, an ecological network of protected sites, 
the establishment of which forms the core of the Habitats Directive.
38
 The Habitats Directive is an 
interesting example of ecological thinking: it includes regulation relating to both species and habitats, 
recognising the connections between the two. It ambitiously attempts to link together protected areas 
in recognition of the need for transboundary action. Ecological justice is an emerging form of 
ecological justice – as between people and the rest of the natural world, and provides a stark 
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comparison with more usual forms of justice which focus instead on relations between people. 
Although emerging, ecological justice is not a new category of justice; it’s been emerging for a very 
long time: in the 1960s and 70s deep ecologists developed the foundations of ecological justice, with 
the Sierra Club then taking up the concept in practical ways. More recently, work by Barry, the GAIA 
Foundation and Wild Law UK has reformed these ideas as Earth Jurisprudence. There has been 
interesting glimmers of recognition of this idea in the form of constitutional guarantees and draft UN 
declarations. A particularly important conception of ecological justice is found in Aldo Leopold’s 
work in which he sketched out a sense of an expanded community of life, in which the continued 
existence and inter-relationships between animals, plants and soils had value regardless of their use to 
man.
 
He saw this value as being far broader than economic value. For Leopold an action is right if it 
protects the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community, and wrong when it does otherwise. 
Such thinking is potentially destabilising and makes us think about Rawlsian justice in terms of 
differentiation between species and temporal differentiation. 
The Habitats Directive reflects aspects of distributive justice, procedural justice and 
compensation/corrective justice. Distributive justice is interesting because the Natura 2000 regime 
includes the need for an ecological assessment of a site which is threatened by development, which 
may lead to alternative locations or patterns of development. To give a quick example, if you’re 
setting up a Scottish wind farm, the assessment calls for an evaluation of the ecological impacts of that 
development throughout the rest of the EU. So what I set out to do is not examine the existing 
categories which are being developed but to argue for the development of a set of ecological criteria 
(e.g. integrity, coherence, resilience). This is not an expansion of justice, but thinking about justice in 
an entirely new way. We can look at this as a collective project of including all species in the biotic 
community within the realms of justice.  
Discussion Following the Sixth Session 
 
- Neil Walker: One way of connecting these papers is intergenerational justice. I think it’s 
interesting because we go back to the debate about the nature of peoplehood and potential for 
peoplehood within the EU – one of the fault-lines in the debate is between those more sceptical 
voices who assume a social ontology of peoplehood is already there, as against something which 
is dynamic and immanently constructible (as Robert discussed). One of the tests of peoplehood is 
extendability over time, so the duty pertains to past and future generations. If one takes a dynamic 
view, then you take into account the past or future versions of yourself, which helps construct a 
notion of peoplehood. If you take an always-already social ontology viewpoint, then these areas 
become very, very difficult to think about in terms of collective action. 
- Andrew Williams: The last two presentations brought to the table the rest of the world. If EU must 
be a just project, we need to work not only towards domestic action, but that domestic action has 
an effect on the rest of the world, so it is not only an internal project. The world of John Rawls is a 
world of the past, concerning disconnected nation-states. Trade policies, environmental policies 
etc. show that the EU borders are both spatial and temporal. Hence, we cannot be so parochial to 
assume that Europe concerns only the people of Europe. This also brings us back to the issue of 
responsibility. So how could Europe be responsible for member states and corporations of its 
member states located outside for acts beyond its borders? There’s nothing to be said about the 
British engagement in Iraq – there’s no questioning of policy as such. Construction by 
corporations which results in environmental disaster – the ECHR is restricted by jurisdiction to 
look into private action. The sense of how far responsibilities go, forward and back, is not 
something we have fully addressed. 
- András Sajó: I would like to address a question that was not addressed to me regarding the role of 
Courts. It is an empirical observation, and you find this in the literature – it is a criticism by 
historians that courts do not look at history. Second, the courts are not well equipped for 
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establishing historical evidence and when it comes to historical memory, memory is handled as a 
matter of evidence. This is the worst thing that can happen for memory as a living instrument. If 
you look at Kononov at the chamber level,
39
 it held that evidence of Russian partisans in Latvia in 
1944 cannot be relied on. My Dutch colleague, Judge Myjer,
40
 provided a detailed summary of the 
events from different perspectives, but he relied in his position on prevailing historical information 
and on the findings of the Nuremberg Tribunal. The Grand Chamber was more interested in the 
normative aspects (applicable law) than in the historical factual context in the theatre of war and 
later. How do you do a historical reconstruction on questionable evidence? The Grand Chamber 
took a legalistic position whether the Hague Convention and the developing law of nations in 1944 
was such that these Soviet partisans in the woods should have known it or not. This is not a 
historical issue – it is the wrong question for a historian. It is not a proper account of historical 
memory. But I do not think it is the proper function of courts to reconstruct memory because of 
the lack of professional knowledge. In any event, memory is something that is more than 
professional knowledge. It would amount to overloading the court. I am reluctant to appraise the 
role of judges as historians. 
- Joanne Scott: I think what you say is normatively appealing but not necessarily theoretically 
inevitable. In relation to external relations, is there any reason why the EU cannot be a hard-nosed 
realist supra-nationalist? I don’t think that the nature of interactions preclude that possibility, but 
what does happen in the type of situation that I’m describing is that there is an overlapping 
consensus of different countries leading to a political dynamic that put in train the justificatory 
processes you have in mind. This is true for global administrative law- the processes bubble up 
and muddle along. As for Rawls, things are profoundly different now. In relation to Andrew, I am 
interested in the kind of processes of exporting of European norms and values, and whether these 
process stops when we export our capital. Such relations are always discussed from certain 
perspectives in relation to private international law such as Alien Torts Act etc, but I’m interested 
in looking at it more from a regulatory perspective- the nitty-gritty when does the EU regulation 
seek to restrain what EU companies can invest in?  
- Jiří Přibáň: Recurring theme of justice not as equal treatment of all, but justice as protection of the 
weak – I like the idea of courts replacing monarchs as protector of the weak. I wonder how this 
plays into the idea of Richard Rorty who depicts justice as loyalty.
41
 If you want to have a 
community, then you have to have the loyalty of the people. I wonder whether you can imagine a 
community commanding loyalty without protecting the weak? 
- Damjan Kukovec: I agree that the European Union should say more about how it affects the 
outside world, but who should say these things – the European Commission, the European Court 
of Justice? The problem is that we are rarely satisfied with what they say and I can also imagine 
we would soon start complaining that they are meddling in our national constitutional systems.  
Second, the discussion of justice between individual and nature reminds me of the old property 
concept as a relationship between a man and land. I think it was already the Roman lawyers who 
said that a property relationship is not a relationship between a man and, for example, a plot of 
land, but between men in relation to a plot of land. I believe we are split between ourselves and 
within ourselves as to how to act and what actions to follow, but I cannot be split between 
myself and, for example, a plot of land. 
- Joanne Scott: Going back to Richard, I completely accept that CBDR is about responsibility and 
capability, and responsibility and vulnerability, and would therefore easily fit into a Rawlsian 
framework. So what is it that I’m telling you that wouldn’t fit into a Rawlsian framework? It’s that 
when states get together, they sometimes cannot agree on anything. Thus, the EU acts alone and 
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has an external effect. This is a puzzle which Rawls did not pay much attention to- the kinds of 
political organisation you need for that kind of externality.  
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